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TAKING STOCK:  CHINA’S FIRST DECADE OF FREE TRADE 
JUN ZHAO* & TIMOTHY WEBSTER** 
ABSTRACT 
China has established itself as a global economic power in the 
past ten years.  This article explains one important but overlooked 
aspect of this rise, China’s new free trade agreements (FTAs).  
After situating China’s FTA boom within a framework of 
international political economy and recent regional rise, this Article 
probes the question of how China selects its FTA partners, 
referencing U.S. trade practice and policy as a framework with 
which to analyze China’s own preferences.  We then explore the 
main features of China’s FTAs, finding that it has adopted a 
flexible FTA strategy that both attends to its own socioeconomic 
prerogatives and closely matches partner expectations.  A 
conclusion discusses the guiding principles of China’s FTA 
strategy and offers concrete proposals to guide the future of 
China’s international economic law and policy. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
China’s rise to prominence scarcely needs introduction at this 
point.  Its steady economic growth over the past three decades 
captures headlines the world over.  This success has been 
attributed largely to China’s careful tending of its domestic 
economy, so many wise policy decisions to attract foreign domestic 
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investment, to form joint ventures with leading foreign companies, 
and to corporatize China’s state-owned enterprises.  But China’s 
influence stretches far beyond its shores.  As a global economic 
power, China’s footprint comprises over a trillion dollars in U.S. 
treasury bonds, 1  multi-billion dollar investments in Anglo-
Australian mining companies,2 labyrinthine infrastructure projects 
snaking throughout Africa,3 and bilateral trade agreements with 
several Latin American countries.4  These outward advances have 
helped position China as the world’s second largest economy, and 
its largest exporter. 5   Scarcely a week goes by without China 
becoming another country’s largest trading partner.6 
Part of China’s transformation from regional player to global 
power is a growing web of international legal obligations.  In the 
early 1980s, as China took the first steps toward reforming the 
economy, it played a passive role in international organizations, 
 
1 See Major Foreign Holders of Treasury Securities, U.S. TREASURY (2011), 
http://www.ustreas.gov/tic/mfh.txt (noting China is the largest holder of U.S. 
treasury bonds ($1173.5 billion), ahead of Japan ($914.8 billion) and the UK ($352.3 
billion). 
2 See Chinese Investment in Rio Tinto, BBC NEWS, Feb. 12, 2009, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7885111.stm (noting that China would double its 
investments to take an eighteen percent share of the mining giant). 
3 See generally Howard French, The Next Empire, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May 
2010, at 59 (describing Chinese investment in oil production, mining, agriculture, 
and other fields). 
4 These include FTAs with Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica. 
5 See generally Country Comparison > Economy: GDP (Purchasing Power Parity), 
INDEX MUNDI, http://www.indexmundi.com/g/r.aspx?t=0&v=65&l=en (ranking 
China as having the second highest GDP based upon purchasing power parity 
based upon statistics generated by the CIA World Factbook) (last updated Jan. 1, 
2011); Country Comparison > Exports, INDEX MUNDI, http://www.indexmundi.com 
/g/r.aspx?c=ci&v=85 (ranking China as the largest exporter based upon statistics 
generated by the CIA World Factbook) (last updated Jan. 1, 2011). 
6 See, e.g., China Overtakes the US as Japan’s Largest Trading Partner, JAPAN 
CORPORATE NEWS NETWORK, Feb. 28, 2008, http://www.japancorp.net 
/press_release/17232/china_overtakes_the_us_as_japans_largest_trading_partne
r (reporting that China has become Japan’s largest trading partner); Malcolm 
Moore, China Overtakes the US as Brazil’s Largest Trading Partner, TELEGRAPH, May 
9, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance /economics/5296515/China-
overtakes-the-US-as-Brazils-largest-trading-partner.html (reporting that trade 
between China and Brazil reached $3.2 billion, surpassing the United States’ trade 
with Brazil); Chris Zappone, China Turns Trade Tables on Japan, BUSINESS DAY, Nov. 
19, 2008, http://www.theage.com.au /business/china-turns-trade-tables-on-
japan 20081119-6b1d.html (noting that China eclipsed Japan to become Australia’s 
leading trade partner). 
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such as the United Nations. 7   “[A] comprehensive network of 
linkages” between China and the rest of the world was not 
established until the 1980s, when Beijing joined, ”practically all 
important international organizations.” 8   In addition, it played 
little role in the creation of new groupings.9  In the 1990s, China 
took an increasingly extroverted stance in the region, both by 
establishing new organizations, such as the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO),10 and by participating more actively in those it 
had already joined.  By acceding to the WTO in 2001, China joined 
another important multilateral organization and deepened 
commitments to various forms of economic liberalization, such as 
phasing out tariffs on key products, opening up its services market 
to foreign companies, and clarifying its trade rules and 
regulations. 11   Multilateral settings have thus helped China 
 
7 See, e.g., ANN KENT, BEYOND COMPLIANCE: CHINA, INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS & GLOBAL SECURITY 222–23 (2007) (“In comparison with its 
attitude to international law and international organizations in the 1950s, 1960s, 
and even early 1980s, [China’s] acceptance of, and integration into, the 
international system have been nothing short of extraordinary.”).  Kent draws this 
conclusion based on her systematic analysis of China’s participation in four 
international legal regimes: security, banking, environment, and human rights.  
Though China’s compliance in all four regimes improved between 1980 and 2005, 
there was still significant room for further compliance in the last two categories. 
See id. at 226 tbl. 1 (documenting China’s overall level of compliance with specific 
organizations and treaties between 1980 and 2005).  See generally James V. 
Feinerman, Chinese Participation in the International Legal Order: Rogue Elephant or 
Team Player?, 141 CHINA Q. 186 (1995) (analyzing China’s increased involvement 
in international organizations as of the late 1970s). 
8 Samuel S. Kim, International Organizations in Chinese Foreign Policy, 519 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 140, 140–41 (1992). 
9 See Michael Yahuda, China & Regional Co-operation, in CHINA’S PLACE IN 
GLOBAL GEOPOLITICS: INTERNATIONAL, REGIONAL & DOMESTIC CHALLENGES 102–04 
(Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard & Bertel Heurlin eds., 2002) (noting that after China 
returned to the U.N. in 1971, the country preferred to only engage in serious 
foreign relations discussions under a bilateral framework). 
10 “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is a permanent 
intergovernmental international organization creation of which was proclaimed 
on” June 15, 2001 in Shanghai, whose main goals are to promote effective 
cooperation in various aspects as well as maintaining security and stability 
through joint efforts by member countries.  Brief Introduction to the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization, THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.sectsco.org/EN/brief.asp (last visited Oct. 12, 2011). 
11 See BARRY NAUGHTON, THE CHINESE ECONOMY: TRANSITIONS & GROWTH 390–
91 (2006) (explaining how China was required to open up in markets to enter into 
complex multilateral bargaining agreements); see also Icksoo Kim, Accession into 
the WTO: External Pressure for Internal Reforms in China, 11 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 433, 
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establish a reputation as a regional power with global ambitions, 
but much of China’s diplomatic energy focuses on bilateral 
relations, such as the so-called G-2 with the United States, or with 
supranational organs such as the EU and ASEAN. 12   Indeed, 
China’s profusion of bilateral investment treaties during the 1990s 
and 2000s bespeaks its preference for bilateral negotiations.13  A 
more recent manifestation of bilateral preferences is its new spate 
of FTAs.14 
As of July 2011, China entered into eight free trade agreements 
or regional trade agreements, with countries as geographically and 
developmentally diverse as Chile, New Zealand, Pakistan, and 
Singapore, as well as with regional bodies such as ASEAN.  During 
this same period, China has been negotiating FTAs with neighbors 
such as India and Korea and more distant countries or 
organizations such as Australia, the Gulf Cooperation Council, 
Iceland, and Norway, among others.15   The emphasis on FTAs 
reflects a new stage in the ongoing development of China’s foreign 
policy, as well as a growing reliance on international law and legal 
institutions to cultivate economic relations.  In the words of 
China’s Ministry of Commerce, FTAs offer “a new platform to 
further opening up to the outside and speeding up domestic 
 
433 (2002) (describing China’s entry into the WTO and how it will contribute to a 
systemic transformation of the Chinese economy); Shin-yi Peng, The WTO 
Legalistic Approach and East Asia: From the Legal Culture Perspective, 1 ASIAN-PAC. L. 
& POL’Y J., JUNE 2000, No. 13 (discussing the implications of the WTO dispute 
resolution system for East Asian countries in light of cultural differences between 
East and West); Pitman B. Potter, China and the International Legal System: 
Challenges of Participation, 191 CHINA Q. 699 (2007) (examining “China’s 
participation in international legal regimes”). 
12 Yahuda, supra note 9, at 103 (“China’s leaders have preferred to conduct 
their serious foreign relations in bilateral rather than multilateral frameworks.”). 
13 For a complete list of China’s bilateral investment treaties, see Total Number 
of Bilateral Investment Treaties Concluded, U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV. 
(June 1, 2011), http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite_pcbb/docs/bits_china.pdf.  
For a history of China’s policies on BITs, see generally Guiguo Wang, China’s 
Practice in International Investment Law: From Participation to Leadership in the World 
Economy, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 575 (2009) (reviewing China’s foreign investment laws 
and policies during the past three decades). 
14 For a detailed discussion of China’s bilateral preference, see infra Section 
3.2. 
15 See CHINA FTA NETWORK, http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/english/index.shtml 
(last visited Oct. 4, 2011) (outlining the increasing number of Chinese FTA 
partners and FTAs recently signed by China). 
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reforms, an effective approach to integrate into [the] global 
economy and strengthen economic cooperation with other 
economies, as well as particularly an important supplement to the 
multilateral trading system.”16 
Despite the importance of this new FTA boom, few scholars in 
China or the United States have analyzed China’s FTAs, or FTA 
policy, in a rigorous or comprehensive fashion.  A handful of 
working papers address the topic when China first set out on this 
trajectory,17 but do not account for the recent surge of FTA activity.  
Recent scholarship examines the trend from a comparative angle,18 
but fails to address the substance of China’s FTAs, as well as 
underlying policy motivations, in significant detail.  This Article 
contributes to the scholarly discussion by examining FTAs as 
specimens of Chinese international economic law and articulating 
a framework through which to analyze the motivations and 
strategies of China’s law and policymakers. 
The argument proceeds in five parts.  In the first part, we 
establish the theoretical foundations of free trade agreements, 
highlighting the dominant methodologies through which to 
evaluate FTAs.  In the second part, we examine China’s 
globalization, paying particular attention to the processes of 
internationalization and regionalization that China has undertaken 
over the past twenty years, as well as its participation in bilateral 
and multilateral organizations.  The third part probes the question 
 
16 Id. 
17 See, e.g., Agata Antkiewicz & John Whalley, China’s New Regional Trade 
Agreements (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10992, 2004), 
available at http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/apcity 
/unpan022759.pdf (discussing regional trade agreements China entered after 
acceding into the WTO); Yang Zerui, China’s FTA Developments, APEC Study 
Center/PECC Trade Forum Conference 2004/HSCC/019 (May 2004), 
http://www.pecc.org/resources/doc_view/135-chinas-fta-developments 
(discussing China’s FTA policy and strategy); Jiangyu Wang, China’s Regional 
Trade Agreements: The Law, Geopolitics, and Impact on the Multilateral Trading System, 
8 SING. Y.B. INT’L L. 119, 119 (2004), available at http://law.nus.edu.sg/sybil 
/downloads/current/jiang.pdf (examining China’s negotiation and signing of 
regional trade agreements “in the context of the regionalism versus 
multilateralism debate in international trade law”).  
18 See, e.g., Timothy Webster, Bilateral Regionalism: Paradoxes of East Asian 
Integration, 25 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 434, 457–58 (2007) (comparing Japan’s and 
China’s FTA race); Claude Barfield, The Dragon Stirs: China’s Trade Policy for Asia--
and the World, 24 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 93, 93 (2007) (analyzing “the history of 
Chinese trade policy over the past decade”). 
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of how China selects its FTA partners, referencing U.S. trade 
practice and policy as a framework by which to analyze China’s 
own preferences.  The fourth part investigates three of China’s 
FTAs in light of the theoretical and practical considerations raised 
earlier.  Lastly, the fifth part summarizes the guiding principles of 
China’s trade and concrete proposals that may be applied to 
China’s FTA strategy. 
2. THE THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS 
Policymakers, lawyers, and economists have debated 
intensively the benefits and drawbacks of regionalism vis-à-vis 
multilateralism, as well as the effects that each might impose on 
greater global economic integration and multilateral 
liberalization. 19   Regionalism can be broadly defined as “a 
tendency towards some form of preferential trading arrangements 
between a number of countries usually belonging to a particular 
region.” 20   Another definition of regionalism is, “any policy 
designed to reduce trade barriers between a subset of countries 
regardless of whether those countries are actually contiguous or 
even close to each other.”21  But multilateralism is much harder to 
define.  Certain scholars define “multilateralism” as “’coordinating 
relations among three or more states . . . in [sic] accordance with 
certain principles’ that order relations between them.”22  Moreover, 
 
19 See, e.g., Jagdish Bhagwati, Regionalism and Multilateralism: An Overview, in 
NEW DIMENSIONS IN REGIONAL INTEGRATION 22 (Jaime de Melo & Arvind 
Panagariya eds., 1993) (discussing the relative strengths and weaknesses of 
regional versus multilateral trade strategies); Robert Z. Lawrence, Emerging 
Regional Arrangements: Building Blocks or Stumbling Blocks?, in FINANCE AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 22 (Richard O’Brien ed., 1991) (assessing the impact and 
future implications of regional trade agreements in the context of the global push 
towards multilateralism). 
20 Royal Econ. Soc’y, Regionalism Versus Multilateralism: Will Preferential 
Agreements Undermine the Global Trading System, http://www.res.org.uk/society 
/mediabriefings/pdfs/1998/July/lahiri.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2011); Sajal 
Lahiri, Controversy: Regionalism versus Multilateralism, 108 ECON. J. 1126, 1126 (1998). 
21 L. Alan Winters, Regionalism versus Multilateralism 2–3 (The World Bank, 
Policy Research Working Paper No. 1687, 1996), available at http://www.unige.ch 
/ses/ecopo/demelo/Cdrom/RIA/Readings/Winters96.pdf. 
22 See Caroline Bouchard & John Peterson, Conceptualising Multilateralism: Can 
We All Just Get Along? 7 (Mercury, E-Paper No. 1, 2010), available at 
http://www.mercury-fp7.net/fileadmin/user_upload/E_paper_no_1__Revised 
_Version.pdf (quoting John Gerard Ruggie, Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an 
Institution, 46 INT’L ORG. 561, 568 (1992)). 
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they think multilateralism represents a generic institutional form 
constructed on the basis of certain principles (generalized 
principles of conduct, indivisibility, and diffuse reciprocity) that 
differentiate it from other forms of international relations. 23  
Particularly, trade multilateralism means, “application of the most-
favored-nation principle on a non-discriminatory basis.” 24  
Accordingly, certain scholars characterize the “’[international] rule 
of law’ as the single most important goal of the international 
system, one upon which all other goals . . . depend.”25  However, 
not every nation aspires to multilateralism.  For example, 
unilateralists and regionalists stress the threat that multilateralism 
poses to national autonomy and freedom of action.26  In contrast to 
the multilateralism approach, regionalism is another option that is 
available to countries.27  Furthermore, there are a few different 
ways in which regionalism can be achieved;28 entering into FTAs 
and forming customs unions are the two most common tools. 
 
23 Id. (describing how multilateralism differs from other forms of 
international relations because multilateralism is built on generalized principles of 
conduct, indivisibility, and diffuse reciprocity). 
24 John Van Oudenaren, What is “Multilateral”?, 117 POL’Y REV. 33, 34 (2003). 
25 See Gabriella Blum, Bilateralism, Multilateralism, and the Architecture of 
International Law, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 323, 331–32 (2008) (characterizing the  
international rule of law as the preeminent goal of the international system from 
which all other goals stem from); see also Zhao Jun & Han Xiaoan (赵骏和韩小安), 
WTO Fazhi He Zhongguo Fazhi De Dili Yu Hudong (WTO 法治和中国法治的砥砺与
互动 ) [Mutual Encouragement and Interactions between WTO Rule of Law and 
China’s Rule of Law] , 41 ZHEJIANG DAXUE XUEBAO -RENWEN SHEHUI KEXUE BAN (浙
江大学学报—人文社会科学版) [J.ZHEJIANG U. (HUMAN. & SOC. SCI.)] 147, 149 (2011) 
(characterizing the international rule of law as a reasonable reaction to 
globalization and  describing its influence on legislation, adjudication, and legal 
implementation). 
26 See Blum, supra note 25, at 325 (observing that a proponent of unilateralism 
may view multilateralism as a threat where it imposes restraints on states’ 
conduct or transfers decision-making power to international governance).   
27 See generally C. O’Neal Taylor, Regionalism: The Second-Best Option?, 28 ST. 
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 155 (2008) (examining whether regionalism meets the 
expectations, needs and capabilities of developing countries and how this option 
could be improved to address development issues). 
28 See OECD, REGIONALISM AND THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM (2003), 
available at http://www.bilaterals.org/IMG/pdf/OECD_RTAs_book_jul03.pdf 
(studying different approaches to regionalism and their relationship to the 
multilateral trading system).  In fact, the trend that countries use regional trade 
agreements to counter any unreasonable acts, requests and practices of their 
trading partners by including internal measures in FTAs that are not usually 
covered in international treaties, is called “aggressive regionalism.”  The Korea-
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An FTA is a negotiated agreement between two or more 
countries or economic entities under which they agree to lower 
tariffs, as well as reduce non-tariff barriers, on goods imported 
from the other member(s).  FTAs constitute a major departure from 
the most-favored-nation obligation of WTO members, which 
requires that all members apply the same tariffs to all other 
countries’ products.29  Because they lower tariffs, FTAs contribute 
to trade liberalization.  Unlike customs unions, members of FTAs 
maintain their own tariff policies when trading with non-members.  
To ensure protection of these preferences and prevent exploiting 
the low tariff rate between FTA members by third parties, FTAs 
establish “rules of origin”30 to identify which products are eligible 
for favorable tariff treatment, and prevent third parties from 
shipping through a lower-tariff member to a higher-tariff 
member.31 
 
U.S. FTA offers a typical example.  See Won-Mog Choi, Aggressive Regionalism in 
Korea-U.S. FTA: The Present and Future of Korea’s FTA Policy, 12 J. INT’L ECON. L. 
595, 597–603 (2009) (discussing the major problems in Korea-U.S. trade and their 
resolution in the Korea-U.S. FTA). 
29 See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 160–62 (2d ed. 1997) (stating that most-
favored-nation is an obligation to treat activities of a particular foreign country or 
its citizens at least as favorably as it treats the activities of any other country).  The 
GATT Article XXIV MFN exception for trade groupings applies to three types of 
associations: a free trade area (defined in Article XXIV, paragraph 8(b)), a customs 
union (defined in Article XXIV, paragraph 8(a)), and an interim agreement 
leading to one of the above within a reasonable period of time. 
30 Rules of origin are the criteria needed to determine the national source of a 
product.  See Won-Mog Choi, Defragmenting Fragmented Rules of Origin of RTAs: A 
Building Block to Global Free Trade, 13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 111 (2010) (discussing rules 
of origin within the context of fragmented regional trade agreements); John Coyle, 
Rules of Origin as Instruments of Foreign Economic Policy: An Analysis of the Integrated 
Sourcing Initiative in the U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 545, 
546 (2004) (borrowing ideas from political science literature and offering a 
detailed discussion of “rules of origin” as “necessary components of all bilateral 
free trade agreements”); Masahiro Kawai & Ganeshan Wignaraja, Free Trade 
Agreements in East Asia: A Way toward Trade Liberalization?, ADB BRIEFS, No. 1, June 
2010, at 5 (observing how rules of origin raise transaction and administrative costs 
in the context of FTAs). 
31 See Moshe Hirsch, Rules of Origin as Trade or Foreign Policy Instruments? The 
European Union Policy on Products Manufactured in the Settlements in the West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 572, 572–73 (2003) (describing the aim of 
rules of origin in determining whether a particular preferential arrangement will 
be applied to a given product in international trade); Mohammad F. Nsour, 
Regional Trade Agreements in the Era of Globalization: A Legal Analysis, 33 N.C. J. 
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Countries sign trade agreements for various reasons. 32  
Entering into FTAs can underpin strategic alliances, contributing to 
security arrangements.33  Smaller countries can also benefit from 
access to larger markets by signing FTAs with larger countries.  
Furthermore, FTAs can help bolster exports and secure domestic 
reforms for economic development, which in turn expedites 
broader multilateral accords.34  From a tactical perspective, signing 
FTAs might help spur broader integration of the member states’ 
economies, political systems, militaries, and so on.35 
There are a few global issues that we need to bear in mind in 
analyzing free trade agreements.  First, in analyzing the respective 
comparative advantage of multilateralism and regionalism, we 
need to understand that achieving the overall welfare of 
international society might not necessarily overlap with an 
individual country’s objectives.  Second, global problems do not 
necessarily need global solutions.36 
 
INT’L L. & COM. REG. 359, 370 (2008) (differentiating between two kinds of rules of 
origins). 
32 See John Whalley, Why Do Countries Seek Regional Trade Agreements?, in THE 
REGIONALIZATION OF THE WORLD ECONOMY 63, 64 (Jeffrey A. Frankel ed., 1998) 
(assessing the various impetuses, forces, and influences that lead countries to 
enter regional trade agreements, with a more general focus on the benefits and 
drawbacks of a regional trade policies). 
33 The European Union and ASEAN agreements are good examples of this 
“spillover” effect. 
34 See Jeffrey J. Schott, Assessing US FTA Policy, in FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS: 
US STRATEGIES & PRIORITIES 359, 363 (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 2004), available at 
http://www.petersoninstitute.org/publications/chapters_preview/375/13iie361
6.pdf (examining U.S. FTA trading policies, with a focus on how FTAs benefit the 
United States and with recommendations regarding future U.S. FTA partners and 
agreements). 
35 The EU would be the paradigmatic case of this multidisciplinary 
integration.  What began as an effort to link the steel and coal communities of six 
western European countries has grown to be an enormous supranational body 
comprising of 27 states connected by agreements in economic, social, regulatory, 
financial, labor, and other fields.  See What Does the EU Do?, EUROPA, 
http://europa.eu/abc/12lessons/lesson_5/index_en.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 
2011) (describing the EU’s integration in various policy areas). 
36 See, e.g., Robert Howse, The End of the Globalization Debate: A Review Essay, 
121 HARV. L. REV. 1528 (2008) (commenting on how countries have strategically 
adapted to globalization); Blum, supra note 25, 323–26 (observing that the 
preference for multilateralism is often not based on an informed choice). 
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2.1. Economic Rationality 
Economists analyze trade liberalization by considering both 
short and long-term effects, as well as weighing the social and 
private costs of adjustment.  Long-term effects are most important 
for successful free trade agreements.  The most important long-
term gains include increased competition, stimulus to investment 
and more efficient use of economic resources.37  The short-term 
effects of creating a free trade agreement are measured in terms of 
trade creation and trade diversion.38 
Jacob Viner initiated the evaluation of preferential trade 
agreements by assessing the trade creation and trade diversion 
effects.39  Trade creation occurs when lower-cost imports from one 
trading partner replace domestic production in another.  Trade 
creation leads to efficiency gains for each country because each 
country will shift from a higher-cost domestic source product to a 
lower-cost foreign product.  Each country will eventually begin to 
specialize in producing those items in which they have a 
comparative advantage.  On the other hand, trade diversion occurs 
when lower-cost imports from a non-member country are 
prevented from entering a member country because of tariffs or 
 
37 See APEC STUDY CENTRE—MONASH UNIVERSITY, AN AUSTRALIA-USA FREE 
TRADE AGREEMENT: ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS (2001), available at 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/aus_us_fta_mon/ (analyzing the impact 
of an FTA with the US on Australia); Kawai & Wignaraja, supra note 30, at 4–5 
(stating that FTAs tend to have a net positive benefit). 
38 See generally BÉLA BALASSA, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION (1961) 
(analyzing the problems of economic integration among sovereign nations and 
presenting a unified theory of economic integration that addresses some of these 
inherent issues); WILLIAM H. COOPER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31356, FREE TRADE 
AGREEMENTS: IMPACT ON U.S. TRADE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. TRADE POLICY 
(2011), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL31356.pdf (describing 
the U.S. implications of FTAs); Richard G. Lipsey, The Theory Of Customs Unions: 
Trade Diversion And Welfare, 24 ECONOMICA 40 (1957) (discussing the welfare 
distributions that result from customs unions); J.E. MEADE, THE THEORY OF 
CUSTOMS UNIONS (1955) (assessing whether, and how, the removal of trade 
barriers, via agreements like customs unions, leads to more economic use of 
global resources); JAROSLAV VANEK, GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM OF INTERNATIONAL 
DISCRIMINATION: THE CASE OF CUSTOMS UNIONS (1965) (analyzing the global effects 
of regional trade agreements, with a focus on the impact of customs unions on the 
world economy); JACOB VINER, THE CUSTOMS UNION ISSUE (1950) (examining the 
concept, intent, and mode of operation of customs unions in general, from an 
economic point of view).  
39 See VINER, supra note 38, at 5–6 (analyzing the economic impact of trade 
principles applied on customs unions). 
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non-tariff barriers.  While not banned from entering in the strict 
sense, they are instead replaced by higher-cost imports from a FTA 
partner country.40 
While this basic binary explained the effects that entering into 
FTAs might cause, scholars have introduced a wide variety of 
critiques.  For example, this basic binary is static in nature, and 
ignores such factors as economies of scale, spill-over effects, and 
improved investment climates.41  In addition, economics cannot 
fully account for the logic behind FTAs.  By including political 
concerns in the discussion, debates focus on the question of 
whether FTAs represent “stumbling blocks” or “building blocks”42 
to accomplishing the broader goals of the global trading 
community.43 
Support for FTAs stems from the belief that they act as a 
building block to multilateral trade liberalization. 44   Instead of 
breaking up global trade into protectionist blocs, FTAs can assist in 
furthering the cause of multilateral trade negotiations, 45  and 
stimulate growth within the area.  Regional arrangements such as 
FTAs lead to increased demand for extra-regional goods due to 
increased investment. 46   Furthermore, FTAs facilitate deeper 
 
40 See APEC STUDY CENTRE—MONASH UNIVERSITY, supra note 37, at 6 (noting 
that some countries, such as Australia, would reap wide-ranging benefits from 
access to larger economies through trade). 
41 See Jason R. Wolff, Putting the Cart Before the Horse: Assessing Opportunities 
for Regional Integration in Latin America and the Caribbean, 20 FLETCHER F. WORLD 
AFF. 103, 105 (1996) (outlining the strengths and weaknesses of regional 
integration plans). 
42 These terminologies are elegantly popularized by Robert Lawrence.  See 
Lawrence, supra note 19. 
 43  See Sungjoon Cho, Breaking the Barrier between Regionalism and 
Multilateralism: A New Perspective on Trade Regionalism, 42 HARV. INT’L L.J. 419, 430–
34 (2001) (discussing the weaknesses inherent in trade agreements that lead to 
inequalities and inefficiencies in regional trade agreements and outlining potential 
legal and economic solutions to this growing problem). 
44 See, e.g., JEFFREY A. FRANKEL, REGIONAL TRADING BLOCS IN THE WORLD 
ECONOMIC SYSTEM 227 (1997) (suggesting that appropriately arranged FTAs are 
“building blocks” for global liberalization). 
45 See Michael Ewing-Chow, Southeast Asia and Free Trade Agreements: WTO 
Plus or Bust?, 8 SING. Y.B. INT’L L. 193, 206 (2004) (concluding that FTAs have 
facilitated new regional trade rules).  
46 See Lawrence, supra note 19 (discussing how regional agreements help 
boost regional economies, which in turn, carries future implications on the state of 
multilateral trade). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2011
02 ZHAO WEBSTER (DO NOT DELETE) 10/31/2011  7:34 PM 
76 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 33:1 
integration between the member states, which may, in turn, 
facilitate integration with the rest of the world.  Empirical research 
substantiates this claim. 47   For example, the “gravity equation” 
approach has been an empirical workhorse in international trade to 
study the ex post effects of FTAs on trade flows.48 
On the other hand, some oppose FTAs because they undermine 
the development of the multilateral trading system. 49   Some 
scholars strongly advocate that national governments should not 
pursue FTAs at the expense of multilateral negotiations.50  One 
fervent multilateralist, Jagdish Bhagwati, points out the “spaghetti 
bowl” problem of regional trade arrangement (including FTAs) 
where various idiosyncratic preferential trade agreements, 
complicated rules, and variable tariffs will increase unnecessary 
costs and finally defeat the objective in reaching a clean tariff 
regime under WTO.51  Moreover, as a result of trade diversion, 
 
47 Scott L. Baier & Jeffery H. Bergstrand, Economic Determinants of Free Trade 
Agreements, 64 J. INT’L ECON. 29, 30 (2004) (finding that “pure economic” 
characteristics, such as distance between two countries, remoteness from the rest 
of the world, and similarity in economic size, accurately predict eighty-five 
percent of FTAs). 
48 See, e.g., Tamim Bayoumi & Barry Eichengreen, Is Regionalism Simply a 
Diversion? Evidence from the Evolution of the EC and EFTA, in REGIONALISM VS. 
MULTILATERAL TRADE ARRANGEMENTS 141, 144–46 (Takatoshi Ito & Anne O. 
Krueger eds., 1997) (describing the use of the gravity model to examine the effects 
of FTAs on trade). 
49 Rahul Sen & Sadhana Srivastava, ASEAN’s Bilateral Preferential Trade and 
Economic Cooperation Agreements: Implications for Asian Economic Integration, 26 
ASEAN ECON. BULL. 194, 212 (2009) (warning that improperly implemented FTAs 
can create detrimental consequences for economic integration). 
50 See generally JAGDISH BHAGWATI, THE WIND OF THE HUNDRED DAYS: HOW 
WASHINGTON MISMANAGED GLOBALIZATION (2000) (criticizing U.S. policy, 
particularly under President Clinton, of engaging in preferential trade 
agreements); Jagdish Bhagwati, U.S. Trade Policy: The Infatuation with Free Trade 
Areas, in THE DANGEROUS DRIFT TO PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 1 (Jagdish 
Bhagwati & Anne O. Krueger eds., 1995) (opposing the U.S. policy of entering into 
FTAs instead of multilateral treaties); Jagdish Bhagwati, Preferential Trade 
Agreements: The Wrong Road, 27 L. & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 865 (1995) (arguing that 
preferential trade agreements discriminate against nonmember parties and add 
barriers to multilateral trade). 
51 See JAGDISH BHAGWATI, TERMITES IN THE TRADING SYSTEM: HOW PREFERENTIAL 
AGREEMENTS UNDERMINE FREE TRADE 61–71 (2008) (illustrating how crisscrossing 
FTAs restrict trade generally).  
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FTAs may create new interest groups whose economic survival 
depends upon the maintenance of trade preferences.52 
2.2. Political-Economic and Institutional Analysis 
Regionalism is an enduring feature of the multilateral trading 
regime and “a natural path of human civilization.” 53   Certain 
scholars find “the preference for bilateralism or multilateralism in 
international lawmaking is often determined not by an informed 
choice but by an instinctive association of political schools or 
bureaucratic affiliations with different forms of international 
regulation.”54 
With the development of institutional analysis, no bright line 
exists between economic analysis and political analysis, as the 
difference is only a matter of degree.  Relatively speaking though, 
political analysis tends to be a more values-driven discipline 
whereas economic analysis strives to be values-neutral.55  Public 
 
52 See David Quartner, Public Choice Theory, Protectionism and the Case of 
NAFTA, 26 ECON. AFF. 59, 59 (2006) (suggesting that trade policy is especially 
susceptible to special interest groups). 
53 Cho, supra note 43, at 419 (proposing that regional alliances should be 
formed in an effort to expand commercially and enhance both economic and 
political integration). 
54 Blum, supra note 25, at 323 (arguing that forming treaties solely based on 
common ideologies can be detrimental to international goals).  Accord Kyle 
Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, Domestic Policies, National Sovereignty, and 
International Economic Institutions, 116 Q. J. ECON. 519, 522 (2001) (explaining the 
inefficiencies introduced when policies determine market access); Robert C. 
Feenstra & Tracy R. Lewis, Negotiated Trade Restrictions with Private Political 
Pressure, 106 Q. J. ECON. 1287, 1287 (1991) (asserting that politics influence a 
country’s trade policies). 
55 Indeed, value judgments appear to be increasingly driving political 
analysis, a shift which has been referred to as “normative political analysis.”  See 
generally Lewis A. Dexter, Political Processes and Judgments of Value, 40 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 294 (1946) (arguing that value-judgments are relevant to political analysis); 
John Gerring & Joshua Yesnowitz, A Normative Turn in Political Science?, 38 POLITY 
101 (2006) (discussing the shift in political science towards more normative 
approaches which are less value-neutral).  On the other hand, the discipline of 
economics purports to be value-free, particularly with respect to individual 
economists’ personal inclinations.  See Murray N. Rothbard, Value Implications of 
Economic Theory, 17 AM. ECONOMIST 35, 35 (1973) (opining that the science of 
economic theory should “purge itself of all vestiges of the unsupported value 
judgment”); Israel M. Kirzner, The Anatomy of Economic Advice: Part I, FREEMAN, 
July/Aug. 2006, at 28, 30–33  (discussing the view that economists should be 
objective and detached from their personal values when conducting economic 
analyses). 
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choice theory could be regarded as a tradeoff between political 
institutions and legal institutions.56  “Public choice theory suggests 
that the political process has an in-built tendency to promote 
protectionist measures favoured by organised interest groups 
rather than trade liberalisation that would benefit society as a 
whole.”57 
Moreover, certain scholars have used a political economy 
framework to analyze the viability of FTAs between countries—as 
well as the desired form that they will take—by emphasizing the 
interaction between industry special interest groups and political 
institutions.58 
3. CHINA’S GLOBALIZATION 
China’s recent FTAs must first be situated within its rising 
influence in regional and global affairs.  The boom began along 
mainland China’s border:  Hong Kong, Macau, ASEAN, and 
Pakistan.  It now spans both coasts of the Asia-Pacific:  New 
Zealand, Chile, Singapore, and Costa Rica.  To understand China’s 
FTA partnerships, we must understand how China has engaged its 
neighbors over the past two decades.  China’s diplomatic efforts to 
cultivate good relations with its neighbors are indivisible from its 
present strategy of entering FTAs with them.59  After discussing 
 
56 See Peter L. Kahn, The Politics of Unregulation: Public Choice and Limits on 
Government, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 280, 312 (1990) (advocating the use of safeguards 
to combat the influence of public interest groups on government regulation); Paul 
B. Stephan III, Barbarians Inside the Gate: Public Choice Theory and International 
Economic Law, 10 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 745, 745 (1995) (positing that public 
choice theory is a useful tool for explaining the effect of economics on 
lawmaking).  See generally ALAN PEACOCK, PUBLIC CHOICE ANALYSIS IN HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE (1992) (emphasizing the influence of the political process on 
government expenditure).  But see generally Cynthia R. Farina & Jeffrey J. 
Rachlinski, Getting Beyond Cynicism: New Theories of the Regulatory State: Foreword: 
Post-Public Choice?, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 267 (2002) (surveying recent scholars’ 
varied theories on the pros and cons of public choice). 
57 Quartner, supra note 52, at 59. 
58 See, e.g., Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, The Politics of Free-Trade 
Agreements, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 667, 668 (1995) (propounding a model in which a 
nation’s trade agreements are a direct result of the relative influence of its special 
interest groups). 
59 The notion that free trade agreements, whether bilateral or multilateral, 
distort international trade has been a key tenet of international economics for 
much of the past century.  But it is also clear that countries sign FTAs for reasons 
unrelated to economics, such as for political goodwill, security arrangements 
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China’s regionalization strategy, we take up its preferences for 
bilateral relationships.  This sets the stage for discussing the 
narrow question of how China selects its FTA partners. 
3.1. Dense Institutionalization 
We have used the term “dense institutionalism” to describe 
China’s recent engagement with its neighbors.60  More specifically, 
dense institutionalism refers to China’s policy of increased 
interaction with neighboring countries by actively participating in 
regional organizations, as well as establishing new ones.  This 
section highlights the important changes in China’s foreign policy, 
beginning in the early 1990s, when China took its first steps toward 
regional integration by joining regional bodies such as ASEAN and 
APEC.  By the end of the 1990s, China took a more extroverted 
stance towards its immediate neighbors in Southeast, East, and 
Central Asia, and the Asia Pacific region more generally, by more 
actively engaging regional bodies, as well as establishing its own 
regional body, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).  
After joining the WTO in 2001, China’s integration policy had 
important spillover effects; relationships built on political and 
security concerns—such as those with ASEAN and SCO—
gradually gave way to economic agreements covering trade, 
investment, and services.  Presently, all of China’s FTA partners 
are either bordering countries or members of regional institutions 
in which China participated during the past two decades. 
In the 1980s, China was still relatively inward looking.  Deng 
Xiaoping cautioned that China should not seek leadership (buyao 
dangtou) and repeatedly warned the Chinese political 
establishment against playing a role in regional or international 
affairs. 61   ASEAN led a campaign to engage China, instead of 
 
(U.S.-Israel FTA), or larger political goals (such as the creation of a modern 
supranational organization in the form of the EU).  The fundamental issue of free 
trade agreements, as Paul Krugman put it, is “a question of political economy 
rather than of economics proper.”  See Paul Krugman, The Move Towards Free Trade 
Zones, 76 ECON. REV. 5, 14–15 (1991) (arguing that regional FTAs tend to 
undermine the interests of the international trading world as a whole). 
60 See Webster, supra note 18, at 440 (describing China’s recent integration 
with countries in the region’s various regional organizations). 
61 See DENG XIAOPING (邓小平), DENG XIAOPING WENXUAN DISANJUAN (邓小平
文选-第三卷) [SELECTED WORKS OF DENG XIAOPING] 321 (1993) (advising that China 
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ostracizing it. 62   Leaders in Beijing reacted warmly and joined 
ASEAN, first as a guest in 1991, then as a consultative partner to 
the ASEAN Regional Forum in 1994, and finally as a member of 
the ASEAN + 1 framework in 1997. 63  During the Asian Financial 
Crisis of 1997, China earned additional goodwill from Southeast 
Asia by not devaluing its currency, despite pressure to do so.64  
Since that time, China has signed several treaties and other 
diplomatic documents on security, diplomacy, and territorial 
matters with ASEAN65, creating a bedrock of goodwill upon which 
to build closer economic relationships.  In 2000, Zhu Rongji’s 
proposal to explore further cooperation in free trade with ASEAN 
further built upon the diplomatic efforts of the previous decade.66  
In 2010, the trade-in-goods portion of the FTA went into effect.67   
 
maintain the political and economic positions which pervaded there during the 
1980s). 
62 See David Shambaugh, Return to the Middle Kingdom?: China and Asia in the 
Early Twenty-First Century, in POWER SHIFT 23, 27 (David Shambaugh ed., 2005) 
(describing China’s shift from suspicion to support for multilateral trade 
organizations). 
63  See Lee Lai To, China’s Relations with ASEAN: Partners in the 21st Century?, 
13 PACIFICA REV. 61, 64–65 (2001) (outlining China’s gradual progression towards 
engagement with ASEAN). 
64 See Pro-Active Policies by China in Response to Asian Financial Crisis, MINISTRY 
OF FOREIGN AFF. OF CHINA (Nov. 17, 2000), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng 
/ziliao/3602/3604/t18037.htm (detailing the actions China took during the 1997 
financial crisis that helped stabilize the region’s economy). 
65 See e.g., Joint Declaration of ASEAN and China on Cooperation in the Field 
of Non-Traditional Security Issues, ASEAN-China Documents Series 1991–2005, at 
60 (Nov. 4, 2002), available at http://www.asean.org/13185.htm (establishing an 
agreement between China and the ASEAN countries to jointly combat terrorism 
and other security threats); Memorandum of Understanding Between The 
Governments of the Member Countries of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) and the Government of the People’s Republic of China On 
Cooperation in the Field of Non-traditional Security Issues (Jan. 10, 2004), available 
at http://www.asean.org/15647.htm (introducing a specific security agenda 
pursuant to the Joint Declaration). 
66 See See Wang Xiangjiang, Si Jiuyue & Zhu Changdu (王湘江、司久岳和朱
昌都), Zhu Rongji Chuxi Zhongguo Dongmeng Lingdaoren Huiwu (朱镕基出席中国—
东盟领导人会晤)  [Zhu Rongji Attended the Meeting of the Leaders from China and 
ASEAN], GUANGMING RIBAO (光明日报 ) [GUANGMING DAILY], Nov. 26, 2000, 
http://www.gmw.cn/01gmrb/2000-11/26/GB/11%5E18616%5E0%5EGMA1-
207.htm (outlining Premier Zhu’s plan for continued economic cooperation in the 
region). 
67 See China-ASEAN Free Trade Area Starts Operation, CHINA VIEW (Jan. 1, 2010, 
1:13:26 PM), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2010-01/01/content 
_12739017.htm (announcing the start of the China-ASEAN free trade zone). 
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China has also reached out to its regional neighbors through 
membership in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), an 
intergovernmental consultative body aimed at promoting 
intraregional trade and investment. 68   Though APEC has not 
instituted formally binding measures to lower tariffs or other trade 
barriers, it has provided the major and minor powers of the Pacific 
Rim a forum to discuss international economic issues outside of 
bilateral exchanges.  China’s participation in APEC not only 
burnished its regional image,69 but also promoted linkages with 
countries beyond its immediate borders.  China thickened ties to 
current FTA partners like New Zealand, Chile, and Peru, and 
potential FTA partners like Mexico through these meetings. 
In 1996, China made its strongest commitment to regional 
multilateralism by establishing, with four other countries, the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).  SCO initially aimed to 
ease military tension among China, Russia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan through confidence-building measures 
and force reductions along the border.70  Since then, China has 
played a leading role in the organization by setting up and 
underwriting a permanent secretariat in Beijing.71  China is also 
pushing the agenda from its traditional focus on security towards 
economic cooperation, improving the investment environment, 
 
68 See About APEC, ASIA-PACIFIC ECON. COOP., http://www.apec.org/About-
Us/About-APEC.aspx (last visited Sept. 20, 2011) (explaining that the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation is a multi-national group, the purpose of which is to 
promote trade, growth, and economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region). 
69 Yahuda, supra note 9, at 110 (“Membership of APEC has also helped 
China’s leaders to promote their country’s image as a responsible member of the 
region.”). 
70 David Shambaugh, China’s Military Views the World: Ambivalent Security, 29 
INT’L SEC 52, 72 (2000) (explaining that China and Russia have demilitarized their 
border region and taken other measures to increase their mutual security, and that 
China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan agreed to reduce their 
military forces in the region by signing agreement). 
71 Julie Boland, Ten Years of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: A Lost 
Decade? A Partner for the U.S.?, 21ST CENTURY DEFENSE INITIATIVE AT BROOKINGS 8 
(Jun. 20, 2011) http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/files/rc/papers/2011/06 
_shanghai_cooperation_organization_boland/06_shanghai_cooperation_organiza
tion_boland.pdf (“The SCO’s basic bureaucratic structure consists of two 
standing bodies: the Secretariat based in Beijing and overseen by a Secretary 
General who serves a three-year term, and the Regional Anti Terror Structure 
(RATS) with a staff based in Tashkent.”). 
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and reducing nontariff barriers.72  In addition, Premier Wen Jiabao 
proposed a free trade area,73 though such an agreement has yet to 
materialize.  Still, as in ASEAN, SCO has moved from an 
organization concerned mostly with security and politics into one 
that actively promotes economic cooperation.  While SCO has yet 
to lead to an FTA, the organization itself reveals China’s 
aspirations to be a regional leader in the fields of politics, 
diplomacy, security, and economics.  Its incremental approach to 
building relationships—first tackling matters of common concern 
before approaching higher levels of interactivity, and recent 
pursuit of economic interests—speaks to China’s regional 
aspirations. 
3.2. Bilateral or Multilateral? 
It is worth mentioning a few preliminary issues before diving 
into China’s preference for bilateralism.  First, as is well known, 
multilateral trade negotiations under the WTO are making little 
progress, such that no feasible alternatives to regionalism or 
bilateralism have emerged.  The bilateral approach has been 
adopted by many major trading powers, including the United 
States and the EU. 74   The adoption of bilateralism is thus not 
particular to China. 
Second, China is also responding to other countries’ efforts to 
sign FTAs, what we might call the “peer pressure” theory of FTAs.  
 
72 See SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORG., JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ OF THE COUNCIL OF 
THE GOVERNMENTAL HEADS (PRIME MINISTERS) OF SHANGHAI COOPERATION 
ORGANIZATION MEMBER STATES, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE PEOPLE’S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Sept. 23, 2004), available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng 
/wjdt/2649/t162437.htm (approving an “outline on the multi-lateral economic 
and trade cooperation among the member states of Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization" by addressing economic, cultural, and technological cooperation 
among members states). 
73 See Chris Devonshire-Ellis, The Shanghai Cooperation Organizations Growing 
Trade Influence, 2POINT6BILLION.COM, Nov. 10, 2010, http://www.2point6billion 
.com/news/2010/11/10/the-shanghai-cooperation-organizations-growing-trade-
influence-7957.html (explaining that Wen Jiabao proposed a long-term goal of 
establishing a free trade area in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization at a 2003 
SCO member meeting). 
74 See, e.g., Sungjoon Cho, Defragmenting World Trade, 27 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 
39, 43 (2006) (“[T]he United States and the European Union are reenacting their 
interwar mercantile rivalry by rushing to form preferential blocs (European Union 
and Free Trade Agreement of the Americas), rather than pursuing multilateral 
trade liberalization.”). 
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If everyone else is signing FTAs and China is not, its exports and 
investments correspondingly suffer.75   China certainly does not 
want to be left out of the economic integration through regional 
arrangements.  Signing FTAs ensures a level playing field between 
China and other large economies like the United States and Japan.   
Third, multilateral treaties and bilateral treaties are both 
necessary components of the international law infrastructure, 76 
even as they promote different goals.77  In reality, a global solution 
might not be the best solution for certain global issues.  Indeed, 
China’s policymakers seem to agree on this point in their pursuit of 
the bilateral approach (evinced in the FTA boom) and multilateral 
approach (evident in China’s WTO negotiations and rule-making 
process) as complements to one another.78 
In the debate between multilateralists and bilateralists, China, 
like other countries, is aiming to maximize its welfare while 
observing international obligations.  China has struck a middle 
ground of combining multilateral and bilateral approaches.  
Membership in various international organizations enhances 
China’s power and status, but also gives China the opportunity to 
demonstrate that it will honor its commitments and actively 
participate in the making of new international rules.79  On the other 
 
75 By way of example, like many other countries, South Korea is in a dilemma: 
on one hand, it wants to sign an FTA with China urging the liberalization of 
China’s markets.  On the other hand, it needs to protect its agricultural products 
at home. 
76 See supra Section 3.1. (providing a detailed discussion about 
multilateralism versus regionalism); see also Blum, supra note 25, at 333 (arguing 
that while laws often need to be multilateral in nature in order to establish a 
transnational society, the numerous rules governing and complicating the making 
of treaties sometimes make bilateral treaties a more practical alternative). 
77 See supra Section 3.1 (detailing China’s developing relationship with both 
regional and international powers in the last century). 
78  See Buzhang Fangtan: Yi Xiaozhun Buzhang Tan Zhongguo zai Quyu Jingji 
Hezuo Daqushi xiade Jueze yu Zuowei (部长访谈：易小准副部长谈中国在区域经济合
作大趋势下的抉择与作为 ) [Interview with Minister: Vice Minister Yi Xiaozhun 
Discussed China’s Choice and Performance against the Backdrop of Regional Economic 
Cooperation], MINISTRY OF COMMERCE OF CHINA (May 5, 2007, 5:26 PM) [hereinafter 
Interview with Vice Minister Yi Xiaozhun], http://yixiaozhun.mofcom.gov.cn 
/aarticle/speeches/200705/20070504725234.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2011) 
(explaining that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and other cooperation 
mechanisms have strengthened Central Asia’s cohesion). 
79 Qingjiang Kong, China’s WTO Accession and the ASEAN-China Free Trade 
Area: the Perspective of a Chinese Lawyer, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 839, 843, 846 (2004) 
(arguing that by forming the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA), 
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hand, for various economic and political reasons, China has 
actively sought out bilateral FTAs. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that China prefers bilateralism, which 
offers many advantages vis-à-vis multilateralism.80  While scholars 
have generated a laundry list of generic characteristics of 
bilateralism,81 only some reflect China’s particular circumstances 
and preferences. 
First, bilateralism allows governments to conclude the types of 
agreements in a manner that most closely aligns with their and 
their partner’s interests.82  In other words, it is better tailored to 
meet the specific needs of the present relationship, and influence 
future relations by making strategic decisions about which goods 
to liberalize, which services to protect, and so on.  The bilateral 
approach allows more flexibility, creativity, political expediency, 
and ownership over the provisions.  This is generally applicable for 
China.  As revealed previously, in choosing FTA partners, China 
tends to choose partner countries that are resource rich, but not 
superpowers.  Obviously, China will not have this luxury in WTO 
negotiations. 
Moreover, areas not covered by the multilateral treaties or 
commitments may be included in FTAs.  For instance, the FTA 
with New Zealand covers movement of people, allowing New 
Zealand to send business people to China and China to dispatch 
 
China will increase its available resources and market volume, allowing it to 
develop into an economic super-power, and that the formation of the ACFTA will 
allow China and ASEAN to work together to form international economic rules). 
80 See Arie Reich, Bilateralism versus Multilateralism in International Economic 
Law: Applying the Principle of Subsidiarity, 60 U. TORONTO L.J. 263, 287 (2010) 
(stating that “[b]ilateral and regional agreements have many advantages that are 
forgone within the multilateral system,” like sensitivity to interest of states, 
reciprocity without free-riding, ease of negotiation, quicker response to 
technological change, and efficiency in signaling); Cf. Paul Krugman, Is 
Bilateralism Bad? 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 2972, 1989)  
http://time.dufe.edu.cn/spti/article/krugman/krugman022.pdf (positing that 
while global welfare will likely decline in the presence of many bilateral 
agreements, individual countries involved in a customs union may benefit if the 
customs union reduces its external tariff to a level that will not result in trade 
diversion). 
81 See Reich, supra note 80 at 286 (highlighting recent inclusions in bilateral 
agreements including investment protection and side agreements regarding labor 
and environmental standards).  
82 See generally Taylor, supra note 27 (arguing that bilateralism allows greater 
flexibility with regard to the design and content of the regional agreement). 
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skilled workers to New Zealand in areas where shortages exist.83  
In addition, the China-New Zealand FTA contains enhanced 
investment protection provisions.84  Furthermore, China will also 
have more control over the timing of the negotiation.  A 
multilateral treaty could not possibly allow China such 
opportunities and protections.  Most importantly, as a major carve-
out of most-favored nation (MFN) principle, without concern for 
giving the same preferential treatment to all members, China might 
venture somewhat further in terms of opening its market to FTA 
partners.  In summary, bilateralism can give the countries more 
room to customize the arrangements to the specific needs and 
circumstances of particular relationships.85 
In addition, reciprocity is possible only in bilateral deals.  
Under the MFN principle, China must extend to all WTO members 
the best trading privileges granted to any one member and must 
treat goods of an importing WTO member’s trading partners on 
equal terms with one another.86  It will clearly be a losing deal for 
China if China extends to each WTO member a tariff reduction 
concession equal to those in China’s FTAs if those WTO members 
 
83 See N.Z. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE, NEW ZEALAND-CHINA 
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: NATIONAL INTEREST ANALYSIS 33–34 (2008), available at 
http://www.chinafta.govt.nz/1-The-agreement/3-Publications/National-
interest-analysis.pdf (explaining that the Movement of Natural Persons chapter of 
the Agreement provides for “temporary entry,” which allows service providers 
from one signatory nation to temporarily enter the other country to provide 
services, and “temporary employment entry,” which allows citizens of one party 
to temporarily enter the labor market of the other country). 
84 In addition to the provisions on national treatment and most-favored-
nation treatment, the FTA provides for additional protections for New Zealand’s 
investments in China beyond those available under prior agreements, including 
protection from unjustified expropriation, provisions to allow the free transfer of 
investment funds, and the incorporation of minimum international law standards 
of fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security.  See generally id. 
85 See Blum, supra note 25, at 339.  
This lack of uniformity allows BLTs greater room for creativity, 
flexibility, and political expediency.  A tailored arrangement also endows 
its authors and their subjects with a sense of ownership over its 
provisions, thereby increasing their propensity to comply.  The 
uniformity of MLTs is thus traded for the individual fit of BLTs. 
Id. 
86 See Peter K. Yu et al., China and the WTO: Progress, Perils, and Prospects, 17 
COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 21–22 (2003) (describing the steps that China has taken to 
ensure that its laws and practices are consistent with its WTO obligations and the 
MFN principle). 
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are not obligated to extend reciprocal concessions.  In fact, this is 
precisely the “free-riding” problem that concerns scholars and 
critics of bilateral agreements.87 
Logistically, bilateral agreements are easier to conclude.  The 
failure to launch a new round of trade negotiation in Seattle, the 
collapse of the Cancun negotiations, and the uncertainties in the 
Doha round negotiation88 have generated tremendous unease and 
distrust among states and led some to question the practicability of 
multilateralism generally.  By contrast, bilateral agreements are 
certainly easier to conclude; only two parties need reach agreement, 
not 153 as in the WTO.  However, certain scholars caution against 
confusing the efficiency of the negotiation process with the 
efficiency of its outcome, simply because an efficient negotiation 
process does not necessarily produce an efficient outcome.  
Reaching an efficient outcome might require lengthy and uneasy 
negotiations.89  Multilateral negotiation cycles are getting longer.90  
International investment law well exemplifies the expediency of 
the bilateral approach.  The failure of the international community 
to form a multilateral investment agreement suggests the difficulty 
of arriving at mutually agreeable multilateral treaties.  In its 
absence, bilateral investment treaties have proliferated and become 
their own corpus of international law.91 
 
87 See, e.g., Rodney D. Ludema & Anna Maria Mayda, Do Countries Free Ride 
on MFN?, 77 J. INT’L ECON. 137, 137 (2009) (examining whether the MFN creates a 
free-rider problem in multilateral trade negotiations by modeling multilateral 
negotiations as a mechanism design problem with voluntary participation); JOHN 
H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC RELATIONS 137–38 (1997) (noting that if a general MFN obligation 
required all code nations to grant the favorable code treatment to nations who did 
not become code members, these nations could take a “free-rider” approach). 
88 See Sungjoon Cho, Beyond Doha’s Promises: Administrative Barriers as an 
Obstruction to Development, 25 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 395 (2007) (positing that the 
Doha round did not address many non-tariff, non-subsidy trade barriers and that 
these obstacles limit developing countries’ exports). 
89 See Blum, supra note 25, at 352 (arguing that the ability of parties to 
manipulate the design of the regime without accepting its proscriptions leads to 
inefficient and ineffective outcomes, thereby diminishing the ability of MLTs to 
overcome collective action problems). 
90 See Reich, supra note 80, at 277–78 (stating that multilateral rulemaking is 
incapable of responding to the needs of the modern international economy, 
thereby lengthening multilateral negotiation cycles). 
91 See, e.g., Efraim Chalamish, The Future of Bilateral Investment Treaties: A De 
Facto Multilateral Agreement?, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 303 (2009) (demonstrating how 
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Signing an FTA can, for certain countries, also have a signaling 
effect—that they are interested in attracting foreign investment by 
improving their legal infrastructure.92  Some argue that there might 
be a “race to the bottom” when all the least developed countries 
are signing bilateral treaties in order to attract foreign capital.  At 
this point, however, China does not sign FTAs to attract 
investment, for it has attracted foreign direct investment since the 
1980s.93 
Bilateralism can also promote political and strategic objectives.  
For example, the FTA with ASEAN to some extent improves the 
friendship between China and ASEAN.94  Moreover, China can 
build its regional leader image by its artful FTA strategy.  Japan 
certainly has felt the pressure—with the implementation of 
ASEAN-China FTA, 95 there is a growing fear in Japan that ASEAN 
countries will gradually become China’s backyard.96 
 
the network of bilateral investment treaties is gradually becoming a humanized 
multilateral agreement).  
92 See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: 
Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 639 (1998) 
(stating that an LDC can gain a competitive advantage in attracting investments 
by signing bilateral treaties and thus demonstrating a willingness to sign such 
agreements despite the harm they may cause to LDCs as a whole). 
93 See, e.g., Cai Congyan, China-US BIT Negotiations and the Future of 
Investment Treaty Regime: A Grand Bilateral Bargain with Multilateral Implications, 12 
J. INT’L ECON. L. 457, 490–91 (2009) (arguing that China is not overly concerned 
with the creation of a U.S.-China BIT because China is already attracting foreign 
investment through other national factors). 
94 See Qingjiang Kong, China’s WTO Accession and the ASEAN—China Free 
Trade Area: The Perspective of a Chinese Lawyer, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 839 (2004) 
(supporting the proposition that free trade agreements bring China and its 
Southeast Asian neighbors closer than ever before); see also Jiangyu Wang, China’s 
Regional Trade Agreements: The Law, Geopolitics, and Impact on the Multilateral 
Trading System, 8 SING. Y.B. INT’L L. 119 (2004) (examining China’s recent trend in 
negotiating and signing regional trade agreements); Jeremy Leong, Singapore: 
Review of Major Policy Statements, 11 SING. Y.B. INT’L L. 277, 296–97 (2007) 
(discussing relations between China and ASEAN); Li Gensheng & Yue Wei (李根
生和岳伟), Zhongguo – Dongmeng Ziyou Maoyiqu Shishi Xiaoguo Fenxi (中国－东盟
自由贸易区实施效果分析) [Analysis of the Effect of the Implementation of China-
ASEAN Free Trade Zone], 387 HEZUO JINGJI YU KEJI (合作经济与科技) [CO-OPERATIVE 
ECONOMY AND SCIENCE] (China) 94, 96 (2010) (demonstrating that the 
establishment of ASEAN and the implementation of the Early Harvest Program 
and of the Agreement on Commodity Trade have significantly improved bilateral 
trade between China and ASEAN). 
95 Cf. Jiangyu Wang, Association of Southeast Asian Nations-China Free Trade 
Agreements, in BILATERAL AND REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: CASE STUDIES (Simon 
Lester & Bryan Mecurio eds., 2009) (stating that given the non-existence of an 
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Under certain circumstances, bilateral and regional 
arrangements can also shift export markets and circumvent non-
tariff barriers.  In fact, Vice Minister of Ministry of Commerce, Mr. 
Yi Xiaozhun has explicitly expressed in his speech at the China-
New Zealand FTA Workshop that “[t]he Chinese government 
adheres to free trade, keeps market open and opposes trade 
protectionism.”97  Since the international financial crisis, a number 
of countries, including the United States, have engaged in 
protectionism by attaching anti-dumping measures to foreign 
(especially Chinese) imports. 98   The China-ASEAN FTA, under 
which China and ASEAN member states imposed zero tariffs on 
over ninety percent of their products, will facilitate bilateral trade 
among the countries under the framework.  Moreover, the 
industrial investment cooperation measures under the FTA will 
obviously facilitate China’s overseas investment in the ASEAN 
member states, which is a pragmatic way to shift the export 
markets and circumvent the confrontational trade barriers. 
Of course, bilateralism need not diametrically oppose 
multilateralism, and they are not necessarily mutually exclusive.  
Instead, they can be complementary forces.  Multilateral rules or 
arrangements may constitute a foundation that provides a basic 
and overarching infrastructure for future development, while 
bilateral agreements could attend to detailed rules for effective 
 
international legal personality in ASEAN, as well as participation in the FTA by 
individual countries as sovereign States, the FTA is actually a regional agreement 
with eleven parties) 
96 See The China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement: Who’s Happy, Who’s Not, 
KNOWLEDGE @ WHARTON (May 12, 2010), 
http://www.knowledgeatwharton.com.cn/index.cfm?fa=viewArticle&articleID= 
2227&languageid=1 (describing Japan’s concerns regarding China’s increasing 
importance in world trade and Japan’s interest in bringing the ASEAN countries 
into its political sphere). 
97 Vice Minister Yi Xiaozuhn, Speech at the China-New Zealand FTA 
Workshop (July 29, 2010), http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/enarticle/enrelease/201007 
/3094_1.html. 
98 See Chinese Tires Targeted for Anti-Dumping Duties, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2008, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/feb/07/business/fi-tires7 (relating how the 
WTO found for the United States in a complaint brought by China); Juliane von 
Reppert-Bismarck, China Challenges WTO Ruling on U.S. Tire Tariffs, REUTERS, May 
24, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/24/us-trade-wto-
tires-idUSTRE74N23320110524 (describing China’s plan to appeal the WTO ruling 
against it for tire dumping). 
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implementation.99  However, this complementary dynamic might 
not always occur.  Rather, multilateral treaties and bilateral treaties 
may sometimes hinder each other.  Parties always need a strong 
reason to sign an additional bilateral treaty where they have 
committed to a multilateral treaty previously and vice versa.100  
Moreover, signing parties must think carefully about the 
compatibility of the arrangements when doing so sequentially.  
However, China does not seem to adopt this strategy by taking 
advantage of the sequential interactive dynamics between the 
multilateral approach and the bilateral approach.  Instead, China 
adopted the dual-approach, pursuing multilateral and bilateral 
agreements simultaneously, aiming to solve different issues. 
Lastly, bilateral arrangements can serve an experimental 
function.  FTAs can help Chinese companies experience trade 
liberalization on a small scale and learn to adapt to the wider-scale 
as multilateralism progresses.101 
4. CHOOSING FTA PARTNERS 
How does China choose its FTA partners?  This is a tough 
question to answer, and one that few experts could predict with 
any certainty.  Approaching the question of how China’s selection 
process works requires some tentativeness and modesty. 
Since China has not publicly articulated its FTA strategy nor its 
selection criteria for FTA partners, other methods of investigation 
are needed.  One way to approach the issue is through comparison, 
by looking at other countries’ trade policies.  When mapping out 
its trade strategy, China grappled with two possible models:  that 
of Japan and of the United States.102  Japan emphasized investment 
 
99 See Blum, supra note 25, at 371 (arguing that bilateral agreements can be 
useful even when a multilateral rule governs an issue because they often involve 
commitments that are deeper and more nuanced than those of multilateral 
agreements). 
100 See id. at 373 (suggesting that countries sometimes sign bilateral 
agreements in order to escape their existing obligations under multilateral 
agreements). 
101 Yang Jiang, China’s Pursuit of Free Trade Agreements: Is China Exceptional?, 
17 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 238, 250 (2010). 
102 See Zhang Yunling & Tang Shiping, China’s Regional Strategy, in POWER 
SHIFT: CHINA & ASIA’S NEW DYNAMICS 48, 53 (David Shambaugh ed., 2005) 
(describing China’s regional economic development strategy and choice between 
two alternative approaches for becoming more integrated with the rest of the 
region). 
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in the region and the establishment of transnational production 
lines but sealed off its domestic market from products made in the 
region.103  By contrast, the United States has opened its domestic 
markets in the pursuit of economic interdependence with FTA 
partners in North and South America.  China has followed the U.S. 
policy of more open integration, inviting neighboring states to 
establish a strong commercial presence in China, increasing 
bilateral investment between the two states, and expanding the 
relationship beyond mere economics (qua Japan).  This in turn 
encourages the perception that China’s economic growth presents 
an opportunity, not a threat, to the partner’s prosperity.104 
We cannot, of course, assume complete commensurability 
between China’s FTA policy and the United States’.  But since the 
United States is more transparent about its selection process, some 
indicia of China’s own trade policy can be plumbed analogically.  
While China has not made a wholesale adoption of Western 
models, whether multilateral or neoliberal, it has pragmatically 
adapted elements of foreign models to suit its own conditions.105  
It would not be surprising to see certain aspects of U.S. trade 
policy reflected in China.  We do not minimize the enormous 
differences between the United States, a prime architect of the 
postwar multilateral trading system, and China, a historically 
reluctant participant in international organizations and only a 
recent advocate of bilateral engagement.  But U.S. policy presents a 
typology that may, or may not apply, to China’s FTAs. 
While serving as United States Trade Representative in 2003, 
Robert Zoellick announced thirteen factors that he weighed in 
 
103 Id.  See also Webster, supra note 18, at 442–43 (explaining that in the period 
since the Pacific War, Japan has created transnational production networks by 
investing in the manufacturing and natural resource sectors of neighboring 
countries).  See generally RAYMOND J. AHEARN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33044, 
JAPAN’S FREE TRADE AGREEMENT PROGRAM (2005) (discussing Japan’s attitude 
toward free trade agreements). 
104 See Webster, supra note 18, at 443–44 (arguing that China is viewed as a 
desirable trading partner by other nations because it takes a conciliatory approach 
to forming FTAs and promotes more than purely economic integration).  
105 See generally RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA MODERNIZES: THREAT TO THE 
WEST OR MODEL FOR THE REST? 5–6 (2007) (stating that China has embraced market 
reforms and basic economic models but has not attempted to import wholesale 
the liberal democratic form found in Euro-America). 
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determining whether to launch FTA negotiations with a country.106  
These factors included geographic diversity (Asia, Middle East, 
Africa, the Americas), domestic business and agricultural interests, 
cooperation in security and foreign policy, and ensuring a mix of 
developed and developing countries.107  Zoellick further noted that 
no single factor was dispositive nor was one factor weighed more 
heavily than another. 108   Thereafter, the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office Report (GAO Report) further subdivided the 
Zoellick factors into six categories:  partner country readiness 
(adherence to rule of law, political will), economic benefit to the 
United States, benefits to broader strategy of trade liberalization 
(such as meeting WTO obligations), compatibility with U.S. trade 
interests, support from Congress and the private sector, and the 
resource constraints of the government.109  As noted in the GAO 
Report, however, the most important factors in choosing trade 
partners included “U.S. trade strategy, foreign policy, and foreign 
economic goals.”110  The appendix to the Report lists individual 
factors that the United States weighed in signing each FTA.111 
Jeffrey Schott elegantly broke the Zoellick factors down into 
four categories:  domestic politics, economic policy considerations, 
partner country commitments to trade liberalization, and foreign 
 
106 See IAN F. FERGUSSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33463, TRADE 
NEGOTIATIONS DURING THE 110TH CONGRESS 3 n.6 (2008) (stating that Zoellick 
considered several factors to evaluate countries desiring to form trade agreements 
with the United States and listing several of those criteria).  The list of thirteen 
factors is also available in a comprehensive report published by the Government 
Accountability Office.  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-233, 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE: INTENSIFYING FREE TRADE NEGOTIATING AGENDA CALLS FOR 
BETTER ALLOCATION OF STAFF AND RESOURCES 7–9 (2004) [hereinafter GAO REPORT], 
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04233.pdf. 
107 GAO REPORT, supra note 106, at 7–9. 
108 Id. at 7. 
109 Id. at 9–10. 
110 Id. at 10. 
111 See id. at 37–56 (describing the nature of various FTAs signed by the 
United States, considerations that went into partner selection, and various 
concerns raised by these agreements).  For example, the Moroccan FTA stemmed 
from six factors, which include (1) to promote openness, tolerance, and economic 
growth across the Muslim world, (2) to recognize Morocco’s “staunch” alliance in 
the war on terror, (3) to ensure Moroccan support for U.S. positions in WTO 
negotiations, and (4) to encourage sustainable development, environmental 
protection, transparency, and increased accountability of Moroccan government 
institutions.  Id. at 47–48. 
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policy considerations.112  Because Schott abstracted the categories 
in such a way that they do not exclusively reflect U.S. 
characteristics, we adopt them for our analysis. 
To be sure, it would be a mistake to view China’s FTA policy 
solely through the prism of the United States.  In general, China’s 
foreign policy pays far less attention to the domestic political 
situation and internal conditions of partner countries than the 
United States.  Indeed, since its founding, China has steadfastly 
stuck to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of 
other countries, preferring instead to “live and let live.”  If the 
United States has sought to introduce a world order of 
international institutions promoting multilateral trade and limiting 
state sovereignty, China can be characterized as promoting a 
worldview stressing “the equal, uninfringeable sovereignty of all 
states large and small, Western and non-Western, rich and poor, 
democratic and authoritarian, each to run its own system as it sees 
fit, whether its methods suit Western standards or not.”113  In both 
principle and practice, China is relatively less concerned with such 
matters as a country’s human rights record, political system, 
transparency, environmental protection, or commitment to 
multilateral trading system.114 
Notably, Vice Minister Yi Xiaozhun mentioned that China’s 
selection criteria include first, that the potential partner maintain a 
good political and diplomatic relationship with China; second, that 
the potential partner has complementary economic structures with 
China and share similar import/export patterns, and as a result, 
the realization of free trade will not impose significant adverse 
impact on China’s industries relating to national economy as well 
as the people’s livelihood; third, that the potential partner has 
significant domestic market and could also serve as a trade hub; 
 
112 See Schott, supra note 34, at 365–71 (organizing into four broad categories 
the criteria that the United States considers when deciding whether to begin FTA 
negotiations with a country). 
113 Andrew J. Nathan, Principles of China’s Foreign Policy, ASIA FOR EDUCATORS, 
http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/china_1950_forpol_principles.htm (last 
visited Oct. 16, 2011). 
114 China’s relationships with such countries as North Korea, Burma, Sudan, 
and Zimbabwe are often singled out to show that China supports “rogue 
regimes.”  A less tendentious view of these relationships would suggest that 
China places economic, geographical, and historical linkages above political ones. 
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fourth, that the potential partner shares a common desire with 
China to enter into FTAs.115 
Of course, factors such as domestic politics, economic 
considerations, and foreign policy also influence China’s selection 
of partner countries.  Take the issue of domestic politics.  Indeed, 
politics in China manifest themselves rather differently than 
politics in the United States, where a democratically elected 
Congressman reflects the interest of the member himself, his 
constituents, and powerful lobbying groups.  In China, domestic 
politics are far less transparent.  After a series of internal 
discussions, policies are often announced by central leaders, and 
then left to the responsible organ or agency for implementation.  
Nonetheless, it is still possible to discern the influence of domestic 
politics on Chinese FTA patterns.  
4.1. Domestic Politics 
One striking example of domestic politics influencing trade 
policy may be the China-ASEAN FTA.  For many years, China has 
tried to build up its western and southwestern regions, whose 
economic development lags significantly behind richer coastal 
areas.  In the late 1990s, leaders from various provinces in 
southwest China, such as Sichuan, Yunnan and Guangxi, 
pressured the central government to enter an FTA with ASEAN.116  
Provincial leaders hoped that tariff-free access to Southeast Asia 
would make Chinese manufactured and agricultural goods more 
competitive in those markets.  Moreover, increased trade flows 
between southwest China and Southeast Asia (Laos, Vietnam, 
Thailand) would convince Beijing to increase transportation 
services and infrastructure (roads, railroads, airline routes) 
between these two areas.  By directly shipping goods over the 
southwestern border, Chinese manufacturers and farmers could 
avoid the transportation costs of first sending goods to China’s east 
coast and then shipping them to Southeast Asia.  Given the very 
low profit margins associated with the agricultural products grown 
 
115 See Interview with Vice Minister Yi Xiaozhun, supra note 78 (outlining 
China’s selection criteria for pursuing its free trade partners). 
116  See The China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement: Who’s Happy, Who’s Not, supra 
note 96 (quoting Zheng Hui, Finance Professor at Fudan University, as stating that 
the Chinese government’s decision to propose the China-ASEAN Free Trade 
Agreement was influenced by local government leaders in China’s southwest).  
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in these areas, a reduction in transport fees would significantly 
boost profitability and competitiveness.  In the case of the ASEAN 
agreement, then, domestic political pressure played an important 
role in Zhu Rongji’s proposal of 2000.  A similar motivation— 
developing the western provinces—likely propelled the China-
Pakistan FTA.117 
4.2. Economic Considerations 
Economic considerations weigh heavily in China’s FTA 
calculus.  Chief among them is the continuation of its 
unprecedented economic growth.  This in turn requires expanding, 
or at least maintaining, high growth in such sectors as construction, 
heavy manufacturing (steel), light manufacturing (copper), 
infrastructure (railways, roads), and the production of consumer 
goods. 118   These forms of economic activity require enormous 
amounts of natural resources, which China has assiduously 
scoured the world for, notably in Africa,119 Australia,120 and South 
America.121  At present, China is the largest consumer of copper, 
 
117 See Syed Fazl-e-Haider, Pakistan’s Trade Bear-hug with China, ASIA TIMES, 
Apr. 21, 2010, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/LD21Df01.html 
(stating that China and Pakistan are interested in developing the water potential 
of Pakistan’s northern areas, which connects to Xinjiang, China’s western 
province). 
118 See, e.g., MINISTRY OF FOREIGN TRADE AND TOURISM IN PERU AND THE 
MINISTRY OF COMMERCE OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, PERU-CHINA FREE 
TRADE AGREEMENT: JOINT FEASIBILITY STUDY 6–7 (2007) [hereinafter PERU-CHINA: 
JOINT FEASIBILITY STUDY] (noting that China’s highest growth industries include 
manufacturing, construction, and transportation); see also David Menzie et al., U.S. 
Geological Survey, China’s Growing Appetite for Minerals (explaining that as China 
continues to grow, the country will need to consume large quantities of minerals 
as it enters each of several development stages: infrastructure development, light 
manufacturing, heavy manufacturing, consumer goods development, and the 
development of services).  
119 See French, supra note 3 (describing the considerable investments that 
China has made in Africa in its quest to obtain natural resources); DEBORAH 
BRAUTIGAM, THE DRAGON’S GIFT: THE REAL STORY OF CHINA IN AFRICA (2009) 
(analyzing Chinese aid and investment in Africa). 
120 See Minerals Council of Australia, Fact Sheet—The Australia China Minerals 
Trade, Apr. 2005, available at http://www.minerals.org.au/__data/assets 
/pdf_file/0009/8829/MCA_aus-china_fact_sheet_april-1.pdf (presenting mineral 
market statistics in favor of a China-Australia FTA). 
121 See China’s Growing Influence: Objectives and Strategies: Hearing Before the 
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 109th Cong. 158–60 (2005)  
(statement of Claudio Loser, Senior Fellow, Inter-American Dialogue) (stating that 
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tin, zinc, steel, iron ore, and coal, and the second largest consumer 
of aluminum, petroleum and lead, and the fourth largest consumer 
of gold.122 
China’s pressing need for raw materials illuminates several of 
its recent choices for FTA partners.123  Chile, Costa Rica, and Peru 
account for a few drops in China’s ocean of world trade, a topic 
more fully explored below.  But vast copper reserves made Chile 
an ideal partner for a free trade agreement with China, while 
Peru’s silver, iron ore, and copper were also attractive.  By entering 
into FTAs with these countries, China was able to correct trade 
deficits that it had with both countries due to its heavy reliance on 
their mineral imports. 
At the same time, China must open up new markets for its 
exports.  In today’s global economy, and particularly after the 
global recession, reliance on exporting to the EU, United States, 
and Japan will no longer serve all of China.  China is particularly 
interested in promoting agricultural and manufacturing trade with 
Southeast Asia, which will help develop its largely agrarian and 
underdeveloped western regions, such as Xinjiang, Tibet, and 
Yunnan. 
Like the United States and Japan, China prefers to enter FTAs 
with countries with which it transacts very little trade.124  Though 
China’s main trading partners include the United States, EU, and 
Japan, there is very little chance of an FTA with any of these 
countries.  An FTA with either Japan or the United States would 
require both parties to overlook a long history of mutual suspicion, 
while certain sectors—such as agriculture and intellectual 
property—could not be arranged satisfactorily as between China 
and the United States, or China and Japan.  Rather, as one Chinese 
 
China’s demand for energy and natural resources has contributed to the economic 
growth Latin America has experienced in recent years). 
122 See Minerals Council of Australia, supra note 120. 
123  See, e.g., Yang Liyan & Lei Xiaohang (杨丽艳和雷晓航), FTA Zhanlüe xia 
Woguo Haiwai Nengyuan Touzi de Falü Wenti Yanjiu (FTA 战略下我国海外能源投资
的法律问题研究) [On the Several Legal Issues of China’s Energy Investment Abroad 
under FTA], 4 ZHENG FA LUN CONG (政法论丛) [J. POL. SCI. & L.] (China) 67, 67–68 
(2009) (illustrating the history, trends, and developments of China’s energy 
investment abroad from the 1990s to the present and addressing the legal issues 
China may encounter when making energy investment abroad). 
124 The United States, for instance, has signed FTAs with Oman, Bahrain, 
Morocco, and Singapore, none of which conduct significant bilateral trade with 
the United States. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2011
02 ZHAO WEBSTER (DO NOT DELETE) 10/31/2011  7:34 PM 
96 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 33:1 
observer stated, “China does not have the confidence to open its 
market to those economies that are huge and far more advanced 
than its own.” 125   China has opted for countries with small 
economies and low volumes of bilateral trade, which will prevent 
the Chinese domestic market from experiencing a flood of cheap 
imports into its domestic market.  Furthermore, entering into FTAs 
with those relatively less powerful trading partners is certainly 
more manageable for China.  Moreover, it could also help China 
diversify its import sources and export market.  By focusing on 
countries with abundant natural resources, China can ensure that it 
obtains the materials it needs to promote economic growth without 
endangering domestic industries through excessive competition. 
Finally, China seeks to complete FTAs with countries that have 
healthy economies and strong credit ratings.  Agencies like 
Standard and Poor’s and Fitch have rated Chile and Peru as South 
America’s first and second most creditworthy countries, 
respectively, and Argentina, Bolivia, and Ecuador as its least.126  
Therefore, it is not surprising that China first signed an FTA with 
Chile, and then Peru, while an FTA with Argentina, Bolivia, or 
Ecuador does not appear to be in the cards. 
4.3. Foreign Policy 
Foreign policy may not be as important to Chinese trade policy 
as it is in United States trade policy, but it still plays a key role.  In 
selecting FTA partners, the United States considers the country’s 
adherence to rule of law, as well as its commitment to trade 
liberalization, and to WTO commitments more specifically.127  This 
is not so for China.  As noted above, China’s traditional concern for 
state sovereignty renders it essentially uninterested in a partner 
country’s internal affairs, such as adherence to rule of law, respect 
for international norms, or interest in democratic politics.  Nor 
 
125 Sheng Lijun, China-ASEAN Free Trade Area: Origins, Developments and 
Strategic Motivations 8 (Inst. of Se. Asian Studies, Working Paper: International 
Politics & Security Issues Series No. 1, 2003). 
126 See PERU-CHINA: JOINT FEASIBILITY STUDY, supra note 118, at 12 (listing the 
Moody’s, S&P and Fitch ratings for Chile, Peru, Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and 
several other Latin American nations as of 2007). 
127 See GAO REPORT, supra note 106, at 8–10 (outlining factors that the United 
States weighs in selecting FTA partners and identifying a countries’ commitment 
to the “trade disciplines” of the WTO as a factor). 
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does China seem especially concerned with whether a country 
embraces free trade, multilateralism, or another economic 
paradigm.  China does not appear to weigh a partner country’s 
commitment to multilateral trade liberalization in making its FTA 
choices.  Chile, for instance, has signed many bilateral and 
multilateral FTAs, 128  which cover seventy-five percent of its 
trade. 129   Pakistan, by contrast, has signed only three bilateral 
FTAs, and one regional one.130 
Two additional foreign policy considerations of the U.S. Trade 
Representative include striking a balance between developed and 
developing countries and maintaining geographic diversity.131  The 
former is important because developed countries currently have 
the market to purchase U.S. goods and services, while developing 
countries are likely to do so in the future.  Such arrangements can 
help lock in longer-term market plans.  Geographic diversity is 
important because of the United States’ desire to be active in many 
parts of the globe and to hedge against regional economic 
downturns, such as the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98. 
China, too, seems concerned with striking a balance between 
developed and developing countries in its FTA platform.  
Although China has concluded a greater number of FTAs with 
developing countries, recently concluded FTAs with New Zealand 
and Singapore as well as ongoing negotiations with Australia 
indicate that China also places a premium on developed countries.  
 
128  See Tratados de Libre Comercio Firmados por Chile [Free Trade Agreements 
Ratified by Chile], BIBLIOTECA DEL CONGRESO NACIONAL DE CHILE-BCN [THE NAT’L 
CONG. LIBRARY OF CHILE], http://www.bcn.cl/carpeta_temas 
/temas_portada.2005-11-29.5590492629/area_2.2005-12-01.2439583052 (last visited 
Oct. 7, 2011) (identifying Canada, Mexico, Central America, the European 
Community, the United States, Korea, the European Free Trade Area, and China 
as FTA partners of Chile).  In addition, Chile is negotiating treaties with many 
other states, including Thailand, Indonesia, and the Gulf States. 
129 See Antkiewicz & Whalley, supra note 17, pt. 5 (stating that seventy-five 
percent of Chile’s foreign trade is governed by FTAs). 
130 See Tanveer Ahmed, Nepal Intends to Sign FTA with Pakistan in JEC Meeting, 
DAILY TIMES, July 24, 2010, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page 
=2010%5C07%5C24%5Cstory_24-7-2010_pg5_3 (reporting Nepal’s intention to 
become the second country in South Asia to enter a free trade agreement with 
Pakistan). 
131 See GAO Report, supra note 106, at 8–9 (listing the “[n]eed to ensure a mix 
of developed and developing countries” and the “[n]eed to do FTAs in each of the 
world’s major regions” as amongst the Trade Representative’s thirteen factors in 
targeting potential FTA partners). 
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China wants to create a sound economic environment in which to 
trade all of its exports—electronic and other consumer goods to 
developed countries and agricultural products and textiles to 
developing countries.  Nonetheless, certain policymakers in China 
have viewed FTAs as a new bridge to facilitate cooperation 
between China and other developing countries.132 
Geographic diversity, at this stage, seems to be a secondary 
concern for China, whose FTA preferences are circumscribed to the 
Asia-Pacific region.  As noted above, 133  China has invested 
considerable diplomatic resources in establishing itself as a 
regional power and, to a lesser extent, a global one.  As economic 
matters are now firmly part of that diplomatic initiative, FTAs will 
tread the same path forged by China’s recent regional 
engagements in politics and security.  The FTAs with ASEAN, 
Singapore, and Pakistan, all indicate the importance of location in 
to China’s FTA strategy.  Slightly further afield, China has also 
signed agreements with countries on both sides of the Pacific 
Ocean, such as Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, Peru, and New Zealand.  
Its ongoing discussions with Australia suggest the geographic 
limits of its strategy:  the Pacific.  This suggests that China is not 
aiming toward the strict geographic contiguity often associated 
with “natural” trading blocs, 134  but rather the idea that China 
wants to be a—if not the—center of gravity in the Asia-Pacific 
region. 
On the other hand, China’s discussions with European 
countries such as Norway and Iceland, the Gulf Cooperation 
Council, and the Southern Africa Customs Union hint at a larger 
global strategy.  But the seriousness of such negotiations remains 
 
132 See Zhu Hong (朱洪), Ziyou Maoyi Xieding—Zhongguo yu Fazhanzhong 
Guojia Nannan Hezuo de Xinqiaoliang (自由贸易协定—中国与发展中国家南南合作的
新桥樑 ) [Free Trade Agreements—New Bridge for South-South Cooperation 
between China and other Developing Countries], 9 Guoji Maoyi (国际贸易) [INT’L 
TRADE] (China) 8, 8 (2009) (arguing that, according to statistical data, free trade 
agreements assist in the economic and trade relations between China and other 
developing countries). 
133 See supra Section 3.1 (outlining China’ increased regional diplomatic 
efforts since the 1990s designed to position itself as a regional leader).   
134 See Krugman, supra note 59, at 12 (observing that neighboring countries 
are “natural” trading partners who would trade with each other even in the 
absence of FTAs). 
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unclear.  Certain negotiations have been stalled for years,135 while 
others do not appear to be concluding any time soon.  For the 
foreseeable future, China will most likely cling more closely to its 
neighbors in Asia and across the Pacific. 
5. CHINA’S FTAS AND SIMILAR AGREEMENTS 
China has signed FTAs with ASEAN, Pakistan, Chile, Mexico, 
Peru, Costa Rica, Singapore, and New Zealand. 136   Mainland 
China preceded the FTA boom by signing Cooperative Economic 
Partnership Agreements (CEPAs) with Hong Kong and Macau. 137  
The Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement between 
Chinese mainland and Taiwan recognizes the tremendous cross-
strait economic activity of recent years.138  As this amounts to more 
than a dozen agreements, analyzing each one (as well as their 
numerous annexes and follow-up agreements) would be 
impractical.  Accordingly, this Section focuses on three treaties:  
China FTAs with ASEAN, Peru, and New Zealand.  This grouping 
captures the geographic and developmental diversity of China’s 
FTA partners, as well as the variety of forms the agreements have 
themselves taken.  China’s FTAs do not follow one path, but adapt 
to partner preferences.  After a decade, the greatest defining 
feature of Chinese FTAs is their malleability.  Though clear 
principles underlie the FTAs, each agreement is itself the product 
of a unique collaboration between China and the partner country 
guided by the circumstances of the day. 
 
135 The last round of China-SACU negotiations, for instance, took place in 
2004.  See China-SACU FTA, CHINA FTA NETWORK, http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn 
/topic/ensacu.shtml (last visited Oct. 16, 2011) (asserting that China and SACU’s 
negotiations are ongoing, even though the most recent meeting took place on June 
28, 2004).   
136 For a list of China’s FTAs and similar agreements, see infra app., 1.  
       137  PAC. ECONOMIC COOPERATION COUNCIL & APEC BUS. ADVISORY COUNCIL, 
AN APEC TRADE AGENDA? THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF A FREE TRADE AREA OF THE 
ASIA PACIFIC 59, available at http://www.apec.org.au/docs/061120_FTAAP.pdf 
(discussing China’s approach to trade agreements, including its CEPAs with 
Hong Kong and Macau). 
138 See Kun-Ming Chen et al., Impact of Cross-Strait Trade Liberalization: A 
Computable General Equilibrium Analysis, 17 CHINA & WORLD ECON. 106, 106–07, 
119–20 (2009) (noting that an Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement is 
under “intensive examination” and concluding that trade liberalization between 
mainland China and Taiwan should have positive effects on the region’s 
economies). 
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Before describing the characteristics of Chinese FTAs, another 
comparative note provides a model by which to make sense of 
them.  Like China, the United States has signed a flurry of FTAs in 
the new millennium, many with the same countries as China.139  
The United States has derived a model,140 as well as enhancements 
to that model,141 to which it more or less adheres in negotiating 
FTAs.  The model includes sixteen subject areas, two restricted 
categories (agriculture and labor mobility), and other rules for 
safeguards such as antidumping or countervailing duties.142  The 
enhanced model increases protection of intellectual property and 
investment while covering new areas such as corruption, 
transparency, and capacity-building.143  For present discussion, the 
specifics of the U.S. model are secondary to the simple fact that the 
U.S. hews to a model (or two) when negotiating FTAs.  In reality, 
because of their limited bargaining power, small economies like 
Bahrain, Morocco, and Oman largely tend to acquiesce to U.S. 
standards when finalizing FTAs. 
By contrast, China imposes less stringent standards on its FTA 
partners.  The substance of Chinese FTAs shifts with the 
preferences and legal requirements of the partner.  If one partner 
wants to take the process in steps, China obliges.  If another 
partner wants a more comprehensive arrangement, China agrees.  
Some FTAs cover the three pillars of FTAs—trade in goods, trade 
in services, and investment protections—but some do not.  In 
addition, FTAs may include special provisions for labor and 
 
139 Under the second Bush administration (2001–09), the United States 
entered into FTAs with Singapore (entering force in 2004), Chile (entering force in 
2004), Australia (entering force in 2005), Morocco (2004), Central America (2005), 
Bahrain (2006), Oman (2006) and Peru (2007).  See 2008 TRADE POLICY AGENDA & 
2007 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE TRADE 
AGREEMENTS PROGRAM, at 107–17 (2008).  The Bush administration also signed 
FTAs with Korea, Colombia, and Panama in 2007, but Congress has yet to 
approve them.  Id. at 112–16. 
140 See C. O’Neal Taylor, The U.S. Approach to Regionalism: Recent Past and 
Future, 15 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 411, 420–26 (2009) (identifying the United 
States’ initial model FTA as the “NAFTA model”). 
141 See id. at 428–33 (describing the United States’ enhanced model as the 
“WTO-plus model”). 
142 See id. at 421–22, 426 (detailing the organization and subject matter of the 
United States’ initial FTA model). 
143 See id. at 430–34 (describing the additions made to the United States’ initial 
FTA model towards development of its enhanced FTA model). 
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environment144  or enhanced protections against expropriation.145  
Developing countries such as Pakistan and ASEAN have also 
negotiated “Early Harvest Programs,” whereby China opens up its 
agricultural markets by lowering tariffs on partner country exports 
before the partner country reciprocates.146  This conciliatory gesture 
assures trade partners that China acts with their interests in mind, 
and helps quell the “China threat” that afflicts much of Asia (and 
the world). 
5.1. ASEAN 
The China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement took a decade to 
negotiate and enter into force, a reflection of ASEAN’s gradual 
approach to international relations and binding agreements more 
generally.  Through repeated interactions between 2001, when 
Premier Zhu Rongji proposed the FTA at the Fourth China-ASEAN 
Leadership Forum in Singapore, and 2010, when it came into force, 
China adhered to the ASEAN way:  meeting regularly to discuss 
important issues, agreeing to smaller issues before tackling more 
 
144 See Free Trade Agreement Between The Government of New Zealand and 
The Government of the People’s Republic of China, China-N.Z., art. 96, Apr. 7, 
2008 [hereinafter NZCFTA], available at http://chinafta.govt.nz/1-The-
agreement/2-Text-of-the-agreement/0-downloads/NZ-ChinaFTA-Agreement-
text.pdf (establishing that the parties would develop joint initiatives to manage 
environmental risks and establish work programs). 
145 See Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the People’s 
Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Peru, China-Peru, art. 
133, Apr. 28, 2009, available at http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/bilu/annex 
/bilu_xdwb_en.pdf (agreeing that neither party expropriate against the other’s 
investments except under certain conditions); see also NZCFTA, supra note 144, art. 
145 (stipulating that neither country shall expropriate against investments of the 
other unless it is compensated and carried out for a public purpose, in accordance 
with applicable domestic law, in a non-discriminatory manner, and is not contrary 
to a Party’s undertaking).   
146 See generally Agreement on the Early Harvest Programme for the Free 
Trade Agreement Between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and 
the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, China-Pak., April 5, 2005, 
available at http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/pakistanarticle/chpakistan/pakhwmy 
/200809/467_1.html (agreeing to implement an Early Harvest Program between 
China and Pakistan beginning in 2006); see also ERLINDA M. MEDALLA & JENNY D. 
BALBOA, THE IMPACT OF ASEAN-CHINA FTA EARLY HARVEST PROGRAM: THE CASE OF 
THE PHILIPPINES WITH FOCUS ON SHORT-RUN EFFECTS ON THE AGRICULTURE SECTOR 9–
11 (Phillipine Inst. for Dev. Studies, Research Paper Series No. 2007-01, 2007), 
http://dirp4.pids.gov.ph/ris/rps/pidsrp0701.pdf (providing an overview of the 
ASEAN-China FTA and the Early Harvest Program component to the agreement). 
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sensitive ones, and making progress incrementally instead of in 
one fell swoop. 147  China even made concessionary gestures, such 
as the Early Harvest Program, to elicit goodwill and trust from 
ASEAN. 148 
China was the first country to sign an FTA with ASEAN,149 
followed by Korea,150 Japan,151 Australia,152 and India.153  The China 
FTA is best understood as a series of agreements, rather than the 
“big bang” type of pact favored by developed countries like the 
United States, Japan, and Australia.  China and ASEAN first signed 
a Framework Agreement in 2002, in essence an agreement to 
 
147 Herman S. Kraft, Japan and the United States in ASEAN-China Relations, in 
ASEAN-CHINA RELATIONS: REALTIES AND PROSPECTS 90, 92 (Saw Swee-Hock & Chin 
Kin Wah eds., 2005) (discussing Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji’s 2001 China-
ASEAN FTA proposal); Ong Keng Yong, Securing a Win-Win Partnership for 
ASEAN and China, in ASEAN-CHINA RELATIONS: REALTIES AND PROSPECTS, supra, at 
19, 22 (noting that ASEAN and China “have targeted to realize the Free Trade 
Area in 2010 for the ASEAN-6”). 
148 SHULAN YE, CHINA’S REGIONAL POLICY IN EAST ASIA AND ITS 
CHARACTERISTICS 6 (Univ. of Nottingham China Policy Inst., Discussion Paper No. 
66, 2010), http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/cpi/documents/discussion-papers 
/discussion-paper-66-china-regional-policy-shulan-ye.pdf (observing that the 
Early Harvest Program provided ASEAN states favorably treatments to 
demonstrate China’s “benignancy”). 
149 See Sen & Srivastava, supra note 49, at 196 (indicating that the ASEAN-
China FTA acted as a catalyst for the proliferation of FTAs in the region, and 
triggered a new focus on bilateralism among ASEAN countries).  
150 Korea and ASEAN also signed agreements on trade in goods and services 
which entered into force in 2007, as well as an agreement on investment signed in 
2009.  See Yoon Ja-young, Korea-ASEAN FTA to Boost Trade Ties, KOREA TIMES, June 
2, 2009 (discussing Korea’s signing of the Korea-ASEAN FTA and other earlier 
related agreements with ASEAN). 
151 Japan and ASEAN signed a comprehensive (goods, services, and 
investments) FTA with ASEAN in 2008.  See ASEAN-Japanese FTA to Take Effect 
Dec. 1, JAPAN TIMES, Oct. 22, 2008, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-
bin/nb20081022a6.html (reporting that the ASEAN-Japan FTA would soon take 
effect and cover goods services and investments). 
152 See Joint Media Statement on the Signing of the Agreement Establishing 
the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area (Feb. 27, 2009), 
http://aanzfta.asean.org/uploads/jms/AANZFTA_Signing_27_Feb_09_FINAL.p
df (announcing the signing of the Agreement Establishing the ASEAN-Australia-
New Zealand Free Trade Agreement, which covers goods, services, and 
investment, among other measures). 
153 See Joint Media Statement, The Seventh AEM-India Consultations (Aug. 
13, 2009), http://www.asean.org/JMS-7th-ASEAN-India-Consultations.pdf    
(announcing the signing of the “ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement and 
other AIFTA-related [a]greements”). 
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agree.154  The Framework articulates the broad economic aims of 
the China-ASEAN relationship (strengthening cooperation in trade 
and investment, liberalizing services, and exploring new areas for 
economic cooperation) and acknowledges the special status of the 
least developed members of ASEAN (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, 
and Myanmar), but imposes no legally binding commitments. 155  
These commitments have instead been assumed incrementally, 
over the course of many years.  They include the Early Harvest 
Program (2004), Agreement on Trade in Goods (2005), Agreement 
on Trade in Services (2007), Agreement on Investment (2009), and 
other agreements on dispute settlement and information 
technology. 156  The trade area itself took effect on January 1, 2010, 
six years after the Early Harvest Program went into effect. 157  It is 
still too early to conclude what economic effect the FTA will have 
on bilateral economic relations.  But the rapid increase in bilateral 
trade, from $40 billion in 2000,158 to $193 billion in 2008,159 suggests 
that both sides are gaining from increasingly favorable market 
access.160 
 
154 See generally Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-
Operation between the People’s Republic of China and the Association of South 
East Asian Nations, China-ASEAN (Nov. 4, 2002), available at 
http://gjs.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/Nocategory/200212/20021200056711.html?36
1458593=2989170482 (establishing a framework for free trade negotiations 
between China and ASEAN). 
155 See generally id. (providing generally the economic goals and contours for 
China and ASEAN to consider during the course of free trade negotiations). 
       156 China-ASEAN FTA, CHINA FTA NETWORK, http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn 
/topic/chinaasean.shtml (last visited Oct. 18, 2011) (outlining the significant trade 
agreements signed intermittently between China and ASEAN in the years 
following the 2002 Framework Agreement). 
157 See Agreement on Trade in Goods of the Framework Agreement on 
Comprehensive Economic Co-Operation Between the People’s Republic of China 
and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, China-ASEAN, annex 1, ¶ 6 
(Nov. 29, 2004), available at http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/dongmeng 
/annex/xieyi2004en.pdf (agreeing that “[e]ach Party shall eliminate all its tariffs 
for tariff lines . . . not later than 1 January 2010”). 
158 See Suthiphand Chirathivat, 13 J. ASIAN ECON. 671, 673 (2002) (noting that 
China trade totaled “U.S. $39.5 billion in the year 2000”). 
159 See Press Release, ASEAN Secretariat, China Ready to Accommodate on 
ASEAN-China FTA (Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.asean.org/24209.htm (“The total 
trade between ASEAN and China reached US$ 192.7 billion [sic] in 2008.”). 
160 See Zhongguo-Dongmeng Jingmao Buzhang Huiyi zai Yuenan Xiangang 
Zhaokai, Huiyi Jiji Pingjia Zhongguo-Dongmeng Zimaoqu Shishi Jinzhan Qingkuang,  
(中国—东盟经贸部长会议在越南岘港召开会议积极评价中国—东盟自贸区实施进展
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5.2. Peru 
China and Peru initiated negotiations for an FTA in September 
2007 during an APEC meeting in Sydney, Australia, highlighting 
APEC’s centrality to China’s FTA diplomacy.161  Eight rounds of 
negotiations later in April 2009, leaders from both countries signed 
an FTA in the Great Hall of the People.162  Fourteen months of 
negotiations is a relatively short period of time,163 especially when 
compared with China’s dealings with ASEAN and New Zealand, 
suggesting that China can respond quickly and nimbly to partner 
expectations.164  Here, Peru’s experience of negotiating agreements 
 
情况) [China-ASEAN Economic and Trade Ministerial Conference was Held in Da 
Nang, Vietnam and the Implementation Progress of the China-ASEAN FTA was 
Positively Evaluated], ZHONGGUO ZIYOU MAOYIQU FUWUWANG (中国自由贸易服务区
服 务 网 ) [CHINA FTA NETWORK] (Aug. 26, 2010, 12:20:50 PM), 
http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/article/chinadongmeng/dongmengnews/201008/321
6_1.html (reporting on the 9th AEM-MOFCOM Consultation held in Vietnam and 
detailing the economic benefits both sides have enjoyed as a result of the FTA). 
161 See China-Peru Free Trade Pact Takes Effect, XINHUA GENERAL NEWS SERVICE, 
Mar. 1, 2010 (noting that the China-Peru FTA was signed in 2008 following 
fourteen months of negotiations); China, Peru Launch FTA Talks, PEOPLE’S DAILY, 
Sept. 7, 2007, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90883 
/6257682.html (reporting that China and Peru commenced FTA negotiations in 
Australia “on the sidelines” of an APEC meeting occurring in Sidney). 
162 See id. (stating that the FTA was signed April 2009 in Beijing). 
163 See China, Peru Sign Free Trade Deal Amid Global Financial Crisis, GLOBAL 
TIMES, Apr. 28, 2009, http://www.globaltimes.cn/china/choice/2009-
04/428436.html (remarking that negotiation of the China-Peru FTA lasted 
fourteen months). 
164 The New Zealand FTA took over three years to negotiate.  See Shu-Ching 
Jean Chen, Landmark Trade Deal Struck by China, New Zealand, FORBES, April 7, 
2008, http://www.forbes.com/2008/04/07/china-nz-fta-markets-econ-cx_jc 
_0407markets2.html (noting that negotiation of the New Zealand FTA spanned 
three years).  The Australia FTA, negotiation of which began in 2003, has yet to 
materialize.  See Yanning Yu, Trade Remedies: The Impact on the Proposed Australia-
China Free Trade Agreement, 18 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 267, 267–68 (2010) (commenting 
that as of January 2009, no final FTA had been agreed upon).  The ASEAN 
agreement was laid out between 2002 and 2009.  See generally CHINA FTA 
NETWORK, supra note 15 (providing press releases from 2004 to 2009 chronicling 
the China-ASEAN agreement).  The Early Harvest program under the agreement 
began in 2004.  See Sarah Y. Tong & Catherine Chong Siew Keng, China-ASEAN 
Free Trade Area in 2010: A Regional Perspective 17, app. 1 (Sing. Univ. E. Asian Inst., 
Background Brief No. 519), available at http://www.eai.nus.edu.sg/BB519.pdf 
(noting that “the Early Harvest Program was implemented on [January 1, 2004]”).  
The goods agreement with ASEAN’s most developed countries began in January 
2010, while the goods agreement with the least developed members is scheduled 
to begin in 2015.  See China-ASEAN Free Trade Areas Starts Operation, supra note 67 
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with the United States (2006), Chile (2006), Canada (2008), and 
Singapore (2008) suggested it may prefer a comprehensive 
approach. 165  More important, the agreement was signed amidst 
worldwide economic recession.  When many countries resorted to 
protectionism, 166  Peru and China signaled that their economies 
were strong enough to withstand the additional pressure of 
cheaper exports. 
The FTA covers the full basket of goods, services, and 
investment, and would eventually include ninety percent of all 
goods. 167   Significantly, the “FTA takes into account the 
sensitivities of both countries.”168  One salient feature of the Peru-
China FTA is enhanced protection when investment is 
expropriated for national security reasons, a mandate of the 1993 
Peruvian Constitution. 169  In addition, the FTA also calls for a more 
legalistic review of investment disputes. 170   Article 63 of the 
 
(reporting at the start of 2010 that the China-FTA agreement had taken effect and 
that in 2015, the agreement would take effect as to various developing members). 
165 Peru Country Brief, AUSTL. DEP’T OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE, 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/peru/peru_brief.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2011) 
(providing an overview of Peru’s recent trade strategies, including its activity in 
signing FTAs). 
166 For instance, the United States’ imposition of tariffs on Chinese tires, as 
well as the “Buy American” provisions of the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009, led many to fear a return to Depression-era 
protectionism.  See GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON., 
US PROTECTIONIST IMPULSES IN THE WAKE OF THE GREAT RECESSION: REPORT TO THE 
INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE RESEARCH FOUNDATION 14–27 (2010), 
available at http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/hufbauer201003.pdf 
(detailing the United States’ shift towards more protectionist trade policies during 
the current economic recession). 
167 See China-Peru Free Trade Pact Takes Effect, supra note 161 (listing some of 
the ninety percent of goods that would eventually be tariff-free as a result of the 
agreement, ranging from Chinese electronics to Peruvian fruits and minerals). 
168 The China-Peru Free Trade Agreement: A Brief Overview, SQUIRE SANDERS 
(June 2010), http://www.ssd.com/the_china-peru_free_trade_agreement_a 
_brief_overview. 
169 See Free Trade Agreement between the Government of the People’s 
Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Peru, China-Peru, art. 
133 (April 28, 2009), available at fta.mofcom.gov.cn/bilu/annex/bilu_xdwb_en.pdf 
(detailing the conditions which must be met to expropriate investments). 
170 See id., ch. 15 (detailing rules and procedures for legal “dispute 
settlement” under the agreement). 
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Peruvian Constitution grants foreign investors the same privileges 
and protections as Peruvian nationals. 171 
5.3. New Zealand 
After fifteen rounds of negotiations over three years, China 
signed its first FTA with a developed country, New Zealand, in 
2009. 172   As we might expect, this comprehensive agreement 
(goods, services, and investment) is predicted to cover ninety-six 
percent of bilateral trade, putting it more comfortably within the 
WTO approved requirements of FTAs. 173  One controversial aspect 
of the FTA was a provision that permits skilled Chinese workers to 
work in New Zealand. 174  With a high unemployment rate for 
certain skilled workers, China aims to employ its excess labor in 
New Zealand’s schools, restaurants, offices, and various other 
trades. 175  Three types of labor provisions exist in the agreement.  
First, executives and managers in certain service areas (e.g. 
computers, construction, and education) can apply for three-year 
renewable visas to work in New Zealand. 176  Second, a set number 
of positions are available for jobs with “Chinese characteristics,” 
 
       171 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF PERU, art. 63, available at 
http://web.parliament.go.th/parcy/sapa_db/cons_doc/constitutions/data/Peru
/peru.pdf. 
172 See China, New Zealand Sign Free Trade Deal, CHINA FTA NETWORK (April 4, 
2009, 7:24), 
http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/enarticle/ennewzealand/ennewzealandnews/200911
/1626_1.html (noting that China and New Zealand signed an FTA “after 15 
rounds of negotiations over three years”). 
173 See id. (providing details on the China-New Zealand FTA, including its 
coverage). 
174 BELL GULLY, NEW ZEALAND-CHINA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: SUMMARY OF 
KEY OUTCOMES 22 (2008), available at http://www.bellgully.com/resources/pdfs 
/NZ_China_FTA.pdf (noting that under the FTA, certain Chinese workers will be 
permitted to enter New Zealand to work in specified occupations for which “an 
identified skills shortage” exists). 
175 See Educated and Fearing the Future in China, N.Y. TIMES, March 7, 2010, 
http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/07/educated-and-fearing-
the-future-in-china (providing commentary on the shortage of skilled jobs 
available to educated Chinese workers); see also N.Z. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
AND TRADE, supra note 83, at 33–34 (summarizing the China-New Zealand FTA’s 
temporary employment entry provision, which allows skilled Chinese workers to 
work in those New Zealand industries which possess labor shortages). 
176 N.Z. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE, supra note 83, at 33 
(overviewing the provision of the China-New Zealand FTA which temporarily 
allows Chinese executives and managers to work in New Zealand) 
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such as Chinese chefs, Mandarin teachers, wushu instructors, and 
practitioners of traditional Chinese medicine.177 A third group of 
positions opens after a determination that New Zealand has a skills 
shortage in a particular field.  If local labor cannot fill the post, up 
to one hundred Chinese citizens may work in a very diverse group 
of occupations for up to three years.178 
An additional feature of the China New Zealand FTA is the 
inclusion of labor and environmental provisions.  Since 2001, the 
New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade has required 
the incorporation of environmental179 and labor standards180 into 
FTAs.  Though not part of the FTA itself—probably a concession to 
China—these provisions impose legally binding obligations on 
China to cooperate with New Zealand on matters such as 
sustainable development, abolition of child and compulsory labor, 
and elimination of employment discrimination.181  To achieve these 
lofty goals, the Labor MOU provides for dialogues and cooperative 
activities on labor laws, working conditions, and labor inspection.  
Likewise, the Environment Cooperation Agreement (ECA) obliges 
China to cooperate with New Zealand on environmental 
management, nature conservation, and in various technological 
fields.  The ECA permits members of the public, and NGOs, to 
 
177 See NZCFTA, supra note 144, annex 11 (providing temporary employment 
in New Zealand to Chinese naturals for specified qualifying jobs). 
178 See id. (allowing temporary skilled employment in New Zealand for 
Chinese naturals in “sectors in which New Zealand has an identified skills 
shortage”).  Twenty-five occupations—boatbuilder, computer application 
engineer, diesel mechanic, plumber, radiation therapist, and university lecturer, 
among others—are covered.  See NZ: New immigration policies for Chinese as a result 
of FTA, WORKPERMIT.COM (Sept. 25, 2008), http://www.workpermit.com/news 
/2008-09-25/new-zealand/free-trade-agreement-new-immigration-policies-
chinese-workers.htm (listing the types of skilled Chinese workers permitted to 
work in New Zealand under the FTA). 
179 See New Zealand and the World Trade Organisation: Framework for Integrating 
Environment Issues into Free Trade Agreements, N.Z. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & 
TRADE, http://mfat.govt.nz/Trade-and-Economic-Relations/NZ-and-the-
WTO/Trade-Issues/0-environment-framework.php (last updated Oct. 12, 2010) 
(highlighting New Zealand’s concern for the environmental impact of its FTAs, 
and its dedication to ensuring that its FTAs contribute to sustainability). 
180 See Trade Issues: Framework for Integrating Labor Standards and Trade 
Agreements, N.Z. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE, http://www.mfat.govt.nz 
/Trade-and-Economic-Relations/NZ-and-the-WTO/Trade-Issues/0-labour-
framework.php (last visited Oct. 17, 2011) (highlighting New Zealand’s focus on 
trade and labor issues in the context of its global trade policies). 
181 Id. 
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submit views on the efficacy of the ECA, potentially applying 
pressure on China from sectors of the society that it has heretofore 
managed to neutralize. 
6. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON CHINA’S FTA 
STRATEGY 
China has incentive “to commit to multilateral disciplines” 
with the WTO, through which it can gain “non-discriminatory 
access to large markets” and intercept discrimination by fellow 
large powers.182  On the other hand, China has also been pursuing 
its free trade agreement strategy, as FTAs can serve its need for 
flexibilities in trade and economic negotiations, which is 
unavailable in multilateral negotiations.  Moreover, FTA 
negotiations present an opportune platform for China to ask for 
what it truly wants, whereas it would have difficulty openly 
making such requests during the course of multilateral 
negotiations.183  Furthermore, with the unpromising prospects of 
U.S. demand in the near future, FTAs could provide China with 
significant regional markets.  In any event, while pursuing FTAs, 
China should also be proactive in pushing for multilateral 
arrangements.184  In sum, China has to strike a balance in its trade 
strategy which includes both multilateral and bilateral 
approaches.185  
 
182 See John Whalley, China in the Word Trading System, 52 CESIFO ECON. STUD. 
215, 226 (2006) (discussing how China’s trade policies and strategies have changed 
since its membership in the WTO). 
183 See Henry Gao, China’s Strategy for Free Trade Agreements: Political 
Battle in the Name of Trade 17 (Dec. 8, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available 
at http://www.networkideas.org/ideasact/dec09/pdf/Henry_Gao.pdf 
(analyzing China’s FTA and its impact on other Asian regions).  
184 See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Schott, China and Doha, BEIJING REV., 
http://www.bjreview.com.cn/world/txt/2006-12/14/content_50751.htm (last 
updated Dec. 14, 2006) (noting that “China should work closely with other major 
trading nations to ensure that the WTO talks re-engage and progress”). 
185 See Interview with Vice Minister Yi Xiaozhun, supra note 78 (noting that Vice 
Minister Yi Xiaozhun has stated that “China is walking by two legs”). 
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6.1. Macro-Level Considerations and FTA Negotiation Strategies 
6.1.1. Individualize Negotiation Strategy 
As discussed previously, China’s FTA strategy is motivated by 
several concerns, including the opening of markets for Chinese 
exports, improving relations with its neighbors as part of China’s 
smile diplomacy, and obtaining natural resources.  China looks at 
each FTA as a unique opportunity to secure a mutually 
advantageous agreement, paying particular attention to what 
China and the partner country can gain from the relationship.  This 
includes taking on obligations that may work to the short-term 
detriment of Chinese citizens, including farmers, but may increase 
goodwill with China’s neighbors, who are suspicious of the player 
on the block.  In contrast to the U.S. practice of using a model FTA, 
China does not have a model FTA, and its FTAs vary from each 
other both in form and coverage.  This custom, in reality, “reflects 
both a pragmatism in recognizing differences across partners, but 
also the clear linkages being established between seemingly 
conventional trade interests and China’s interests in wider 
economic, diplomatic and strategic relationships.”186  Given the fact 
that the objectives in each negotiation vary, it is advisable for 
China to customize its negotiation strategy for each potential FTA 
partner individually.187  
With respect to long-term strategies, there is a long list of FTAs 
under negotiation or consideration, although it seems that all of 
them will take a long time to conclude for one reason or another.  
FTAs under negotiation include the following:  China-GCC (Gulf 
Cooperation Council) FTA, 188  China-Australia FTA, 189  China-
Iceland FTA, China-Norway FTA,190 and China-SACU (Southern 
 
186 Antkiewicz & Whalley, supra note 17, pt. 6. 
187 See, e.g., Barfield, supra note 18, at 110 (discussing China’s “pragmatic” 
FTA approach to negotiation that is “individually tailored to the needs and 
priorities” of each country). 
188 Energy security bears significant importance in the negotiations. 
189 See, e.g., Yanning Yu, Trade Remedies: The Impact on the Proposed Australia-
China Free Trade Agreement, 18 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 267, 296 (2010) (emphasizing 
that “the enactment of trade remedy measures in FTAs may relieve political 
pressures that are imposed on negotiating parties to some degree during 
negotiations and thus facilitate agreements”). 
190 See Press Release, China FTA Network, Eighth Round Negotiation of 
China-Norway FTA Held in Norway (Sept. 16, 2010), available at 
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African Customs Union) FTA.  Potential FTAs under consideration 
include:  China-India Regional Trade Arrangement Joint Feasibility 
Study, China-Korea FTA Joint Feasibility Study, China-Japan-
Korea Joint Study, and China-Switzerland FTA Joint Study.  It 
seems that as long as those potential partners need China more 
than China needs them,191  China will have stronger bargaining 
power in the negotiation process and can therefore afford to wait. 
6.1.2.  Continue Bilateral Negotiations while Simultaneously 
Pushing for an East Asian FTA 
Based on our analysis, we predict that the future of China’s 
FTAs will continue to be bilateral.  Though scholars and officials 
occasionally speculate about an East Asian FTA or Asia-wide FTA, 
such a plan would require difficult multilateral negotiations 
among states that have not generated sufficient goodwill and trust.  
Given the failure of multilateral trade negotiations at the WTO 
level, it is unlikely that China, Japan, Korea, and ASEAN could 
easily overcome historical and political enmities to join together.  
Moreover, the U.S. trade initiative on the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement has made the game even more complicated.  Instead, 
China will likely seek out small trade partners who possess 
strategic interests for China, at least in the near future—whether on 
the security front (like Pakistan), diplomatic front (like ASEAN), or 
labor mobility front (like New Zealand). 
However, with its rapid development in economy, it is a good 
opportunity for China to push for an East Asia-wide FTA through 
which to seize the leadership role in Asia.  Indeed, there are 
already various proposals for a region-wide FTA, including an East 
Asia Free Trade Area among the ASEAN+3 countries and a 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership for East Asia among the 
ASEAN+6 countries.  It is debatable whether it is desirable to 
create a region-wide FTA by consolidating the plethora of bilateral 
 
http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/enarticle/enrelease/201009/3504_1.html (describing 
negotiations between China and Norway “on such topics as trade in goods and 
services, rules of origin, plants, plant hygienic standards, technical barriers to 
trade, trade remedy and facilitation”) 
191 See Press Release, China FTA Network, News Analysis ACFTA We Need 
China More Than They Need Us (Apr. 20, 2010), available at 
http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/enarticle/enrelease/201006/2939_1.html (noting that 
China increasingly absorbs exports while traditional trade markets shrink creating 
a reliance on China as a source of imports). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol33/iss1/2
02 ZHAO WEBSTER (DO NOT DELETE) 10/31/2011  7:34 PM 
2011] CHINA’S FIRST DECADE OF FREE TRADE 111 
and plurilateral FTAs.  Scholars have divergent viewpoints.  Some 
argue that a region-wide FTA would generate much greater 
benefits than the existing FTAs by increasing market size—and 
therefore specialization and economies of scale—facilitating 
investment and technology transfer, and simplifying tariff 
schedules, rules, and standards.  Moreover, the prior Asian 
financial crisis has warned people in Asia that collective efforts are 
needed when facing common challenges in the areas of trade and 
investment. 192  Furthermore, an East Asian-wide FTA adopting a 
uniform rule of origin will be administratively efficient to reduce 
the “spaghetti bowl” effect in Asia.193  However, pessimists argue 
that the countries of East Asia are too diverse to be able to agree on 
an FTA.  In any event, pushing for an Asia-wide FTA seems like a 
plausible strategy for China to achieve its broader goal as the 
regional leader in Asia. 
6.1.3.  Leverage the Hubbing Effect 
Certain scholars have found that the hubbing effect plays an 
important role in China’s FTA strategy.194  Many of China’s FTA 
partners are important FTA hubs.  So far, China has concluded 
FTAs, or entered into negotiations, with almost every major region 
in the world, including Europe (Iceland and Norway), America 
(Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica), the Middle East (GCC), Africa 
(SACU), East Asia (Korea), Southeast Asia (ASEAN and 
Singapore), South Asia (Pakistan and India), and Oceania (New 
Zealand and Australia).  By entering FTAs with those partners who 
are FTA hubs, China could potentially tap into the broader markets 
created by FTA arrangements already in place.195 
 
192 See Kawai & Wignaraja, supra note 30, at 7 (discussing how “a region-wide 
FTA may make it easier to achieve” WTO trade deals because regional agreements 
would already encompass issues about agricultural and industrial goods). 
193 See id. at 5–7 (arguing that the “spaghetti bowl” of “overlapping and 
complex FTAs in East Asia” created an “explosion of deals” and tariffs that have 
increased transaction costs significantly for small and medium-sized enterprises, 
those who can least afford them). 
194 See Gao, supra note 183, at 9–10 (stating that the hubbing effect seems to be 
more important than domestic market size in determining China’s FTA strategy). 
195 See id. at 10 (explaining that entering in RTAs with countries who are 
members of the EFTA, EEA, and SAARC is a cost-effective method of “exploring 
new markets” and could potentially lead to entrance into larger markets).   
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6.1.4.  Speed is Precious 
With the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement coming into 
force, “there is a growing fear in Japan that ASEAN countries will 
gradually become China’s backyard.”196  Moreover, depending on 
how fully the FTA is implemented, the China-ASEAN FTA might 
place the United States at an economic disadvantage.  The Obama 
Administration needs to push Congress to renew the Trade 
Promotion Authority in order for FTAs successfully negotiated by 
U.S. trade representatives to be approved by Congress.  As a result, 
China should try to make FTA arrangements as quickly as possible 
to get an edge in the region. 
6.1.5.  Artfully Handle FTAs and BITs 
Unlike prior practice, where FTAs and BITs were used as two 
separate and parallel legal instruments to address trade and 
investment issues, respectively, it is currently not unusual to find 
an investment chapter in FTAs.  As a result, there is a possibility 
that countries will have to face a more comprehensive mode of 
negotiations where both trade and investment issues are on the 
negotiation table at once.  For instance, the United States has 
successfully used its leverage to gain “access in key service sectors 
in partner countries in return for accelerated bilateral tariff 
elimination. “197  Similarly, China needs to analyze carefully what it 
can offer and what it can gain in both trade and investment.  In the 
situation where potential partners need China more than China 
needs them in terms of trade,198 China should try to negotiate trade 
and investment matters all at once and should be able to use the 
leverage to request more from its counterpart.  In addition, “[f]rom 
an administrative perspective, a comprehensive inclusion of 
investment matters into an FTA . . . [might] reduce the costs of 
administrating bilateral economic relations.”199  Moreover, it is a 
 
196 The China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement: Who’s Happy, Who’s Not, supra 
note 96. 
197 Antkiewicz & Whalley, supra note 17, pt. 1 (citation omitted). 
198 See, e.g., Press Release, China FTA Network, supra note 191 (stating that 
capital goods and intermediate goods imported from China are necessary for 
Indonesian industries to “operate and grow”).  
199 Chang-fa Lo, A Comparison of BIT and the Investment Chapter of Free Trade 
Agreement from Policy Perspective, 3 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 147, 
167 (2008). 
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good way for China to make sure that it can invest and 
subsequently control strategic resources. 
Should China decide to incorporate an investment chapter into 
an FTA, it needs to pay attention to two important issues.  First, 
China should be especially cautious in affording pre-investment 
national treatment to foreign investors, simply because pre-
investment national treatment “can bring about more far-reaching 
influence upon [the] host state than post-establishment [national 
treatment].”200  Second, given that it is unclear whether an investor 
may rely on an MFN clause to invoke the dispute settlement 
provisions of a third-party treaty that are relatively more favorable 
to the investor, 201  it is advisable for China to exclude the 
application of MFN on dispute settlement provisions at the 
moment. 
6.1.6.  Continue to Seek Market Economy Status from FTA Partners 
China’s status as an economy in transition has put China at a 
significant disadvantage in the anti-dumping investigations.202  As 
a result, China has been seeking recognition of market economy 
status from individual countries through various ways.  Among 
them, using this recognition as a precondition to start FTA 
negotiations is a sound strategy.  In fact, as more and more 
economies recognize China’s market economy status, there would 
be pressure on those stubborn ones who still deem China a non-
market economy. 
 
200 Congyan, supra note 93, at 472 (2009). 
201 See, e.g., Yannick Radi, The Application of the Most-Favoured-Nation Clause to 
the Dispute Settlement Provisions of Bilateral Investment Treaties: Domesticating the 
“Trojan Horse,” 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 757, 764 (2007) (evaluating arguments on the 
applicability of the most-favored-nation clause to the dispute settlement 
provisions of bilateral investment treaties and arguing that the former nearly 
always covers the latter); Scott Vesel, Clearing a Path Through a Tangled 
Jurisprudence: Most-Favored-Nation Clauses and Dispute Settlement Provisions in 
Bilateral Investment Treaties, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 125, 126 (2007) (citing that 
international law presents different MFN clauses in different treaties, rather than 
having any single convergence and interpretation that investors can rely upon). 
202 See Andrew L. Stoler, Exec. Dir., Inst. for Int’l Bus., Econ. & Law, 
Treatment of China as a Non-Market Economy: Implications for Antidumping 
and Countervailing Measures and Impact on Chinese Company Operations in the 
WTO Framework 1 (Dec. 1–2, 2003), http://www.iit.adelaide.edu.au 
/docs/Shanghai%20Speech.pdf (indicating that China has retained its status as a 
non-market economy and is treated as such by other WTO members). 
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6.1.7.  Establish an Effective Dispute Settlement and Enforcement 
Mechanism 
An efficient dispute resolution mechanism is paramount to 
successful arrangement of a free trade agreement.  As mentioned 
previously, nowadays, lots of FTAs cover both trade and 
investment matters.  Given the different nature of trade and 
investment, they warrant differentiated dispute mechanisms.  As 
Alan O. Sykes has insightfully pointed out, a private right of action 
for money damages is particularly valuable in the international 
investment arena,where the objective is to lower the cost of capital 
for new investments.  This objective is absent in trade matters 
where “trading nations will often prefer to act as political filters” 
and deny private enforcement actions that can lessen political 
welfare. 203   Here, the dispute settlement mechanism under the 
NAFTA framework is a good example to follow. 
Moreover, a dispute arising under an FTA is also likely to be 
covered by the WTO Agreement and the dispute settlement 
mechanism as stipulated in BITs.  To avoid such possible parallel 
proceedings, it is advisable to include a “single forum” 
requirement per Article 2005 of Chapter 20 in NAFTA,204 which 
essentially requires the parties to choose one forum to solve the 
disputes. 
6.2. Coordinate Domestic Institutions and Companies 
For firms using FTAs, institutional support from government 
agencies 205  and non-governmental agencies such as business 
associations is important.  Some estimate that the low utilization 
ratio of China’s FTAs in certain areas may be due to a lack of 
 
203 See Alan O. Sykes, Public Versus Private Enforcement of International 
Economic Law: Standing and Remedy, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 631, 631 (2005) (developing 
“a theory of the rules regarding standing and remedy in international trade and 
investment agreements”). 
204 See North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 2005, Dec. 
17, 1992, 20 I.L.M. 3 (1993), available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net 
/nafta/chap-20.pdf (indicating that any agreement negotiated may be settled at 
the forum of either party “at the discretion of the complaining party”).   
205 The main government agencies involved in assisting firms with issues 
regarding FTA usage and certificate of origin applications in the PRC are the 
Ministry of Commerce (including local departments of commerce), China 
Customs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and other agencies such as the State 
General Administration for Quality Supervision, Inspection, and Quarantine. 
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awareness about existing FTAs and the benefits, and a lack of 
information on the relevant rules.206  A study indicates that the 
Ministry of Commerce and China Customs have important roles to 
play in helping firms to use FTAs for exports and therefore should 
strengthen their capacities to support the business community’s 
use of FTAs for exports and the expansion of services and FDI 
flows. 207   Non-governmental agencies, such as law firms and 
private consultants, are another source of assistance for firms. 
Importantly, to address the firms’ concerns, more efforts 
should be made to improve the assistance available for making the 
best use of the signed FTAs.  Special programs and institutions 
should be developed to provide FTA-related information, training, 
and consulting services for China’s corporations.  “An electronic 
information exchange and sharing mechanism should be built by” 
governmental and non-governmental agencies cooperatively “in 
order to maximize the utilization of services provided by both the 
public and private sectors.”208 
Lack of communication and difficulty of interagency 
coordination, particularly between the Ministry of Commerce and 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, have significantly reduced 
administrative efficiency in handling FTA related matters.  As a 
result, establishing an FTA taskforce made of representatives of 
key government agencies would be an efficient way to facilitate 
domestic coordination.209 
 
206 See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, CHINA’S FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS: 
LOWERING LANDED COSTS AND GAINING COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 3, available at 
http://www.pwccustoms.com/webmedia/doc/633910492656405807_fta_lower_l
and_cost.pdf (noting that companies need to proactively plan and put into place 
new processes to take advantage of the, as of now underutilized, Chinese FTA 
system). 
207 See Yunling Zhang, The Impact of Free Trade Agreements on Business Activity: 
A Survey of Firms in the People’s Republic of China 23–4 (Asian Dev. Bank Inst., 
Working Paper No. 251, 2010), available at http://www.adbi.org/files 
/2010.10.12.wp251.impact.fta.business.activity.prc.pdf (suggesting that more 
effort should be made by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, the China Council 
for the Promotion of International Trade, and the China Chamber of International 
Commerce, to address the concerns of firms in utilizing FTAs). 
208 See id. at 27 (making policy recommendations based on the study’s 
findings). 
209 See Zhang Fan (张帆), Lun Goujian Zhongguo de FTA Zhanlüe (论构建中
国的FTA战略) [On Establishing China’s FTA Strategy], 5 KAIFANG DAOBAO (开放导
报 ) [CHINA OPENING HERALD], 74 (2004) (demonstrating the significance of 
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As argued before, an effective and efficient dispute settlement 
mechanism is essential for the success of FTAs.  However, under 
most FTAs, a private party who is unsatisfied with the measures 
adopted by a government can only report the matter to his own 
government, who will conduct a multifaceted balancing (taking 
into account economic and political concerns) and then decide 
whether to raise the matter with the other government.  As a result, 
smooth exchange of information and cogent cooperation between 
governmental agencies and private parties are crucial to ensure 
efficient conflict resolution under the framework of FTAs.  In order 
to facilitate cooperation between public and private sectors to solve 
the problem of information asymmetry arising out of different 
objectives between both sectors, this Article tries to promote a 
workable formula and information filter mechanism for the trade 
agency to prioritize petitions. 
7.  CONCLUSION 
China’s trade policy and FTA strategy has significant 
implications for all, whether inside or outside of China. 
Multilateralism (such as WTO) and regionalism (such as FTAs) are 
the two major paths for international trade.  China needs to 
continue to “walk on two legs:”  China needs to participate more 
proactively in the rulemaking of multilateral negotiations on 
international trade while making full use of FTAs (as part of its 
larger political and diplomatic framework) to influence the 
international environment. 
 
 
establishing China’s FTA strategy, analyzing the strategy’s basic structure, and 
proposing feasible ways to implement the strategy in China). 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
Signing Parties Implementation 
Date 
Name of the 
Agreement 
The People’s 
Republic of 
Bangladesh, the 
People’s Republic of 
China, the Republic 
of India, the Lao 
People’s Democratic 
Republic, the 
Republic of Korea, 
and the Democratic 
Socialist Republic of 
Sri Lanka  
2006.9.1 Asia-Pacific Trade 
Agreement 
The People’s 
Republic of China 
and the Republic of 
Costa Rica  
2010.4.8 The Free Trade 
Agreement between 
the Government of the  
People’s Republic of 
China and the 
Government of the 
Republic of Costa Rica 
The People’s 
Republic of China 
and the Republic of 
Peru 
2010.3.1 The Free Trade 
Agreement between 
the Government of the 
People’s Republic of 
China and the 
Government of the 
Republic of Peru 
The People’s 
Republic of China 
and the Republic of 
Singapore 
2009.1.1 The Free Trade 
Agreement between 
the Government of the 
People’s Republic of 
China and the 
Government of the 
Republic of Singapore 
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The People’s 
Republic of China 
and New Zealand 
2008.10.1 The Free Trade 
Agreement between 
the Government of the 
People’s Republic of 
China and the 
Government of New 
Zealand  
The People’s 
Republic of China 
and the Republic of 
Chile 
2006.10.1 The Free Trade 
Agreement between 
the Government of the 
People’s Republic of 
China and the 
Government of the 
Republic of Chile 
The People’s 
Republic of China 
and the Islamic of 
Pakistan 
2009.10.10 The Free Trade 
Agreement between 
the Government of the 
People’s Republic of 
China and the 
Government of the 
Islamic Republic of 
Pakistan 
The People’s 
Republic of China  
and Brunei 
Darussalam, the 
Kingdom of 
Cambodia,  the 
Republic of 
Indonesia, the Lao 
People’s Democratic 
Republic Malaysia, 
the Union of 
Myanmar, the 
Republic of the 
Philippines, the 
Republic of 
Singapore, the 
Kingdom of 
Thailand and the 
Socialist  Republic 
2010.1.1 Framework 
Agreement on 
Comprehensive 
Economic Co-
Operation between the 
People’s Republic of 
China and the 
Association of South 
East Asian Nations 
(2002), Agreement on 
Trade in Goods of the 
Framework 
Agreement on 
Comprehensive 
Economic 
Co-Operation between 
the People’s Republic 
of China and the 
Association of South  
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of Viet Nam,  
Member States of 
the Association of 
Southeast Asian 
Nations 
(collectively, 
ASEAN) 
East Asian Nations 
(2004), Agreement on 
Trade in Services of 
the Framework 
Agreement on 
Comprehensive 
Economic 
Co-Operation between 
the People’s Republic 
of China and the 
Association of South 
East Asian Nations 
(2007) 
Mainland China 
and Hong Kong, 
Macao SAR 
Government 
2003 Closer Economic 
Partnership 
Arrangement (2003), 
various 
supplementary 
agreements 
Mainland China 
and Taiwan 
2010.6.29 Economic Cooperation 
Framework 
Agreement 
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